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The Endless Cycle of Abuse: Why 42
U.S.C. § 1983 Is Ineffective in
Deterring Police Brutality
by
ALISON L. PATTON*

I. Introduction
When a police officer uses excessive force against an individual, that
individual can sue the officer for violating her civil rights under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983.1 Section 1983 actions seek damages or injunctions against abu-

sive police techniques. 2 Years after Congress enacted section 1983, 3 attorneys, legislators and citizens are questioning the statute's effectiveness
as a legal tool for deterring police misconduct.
There are three major weaknesses to section 1983 suits. First, these
actions are difficult and expensive to pursue. 4 Since most victims of mis* Member, Third Year Class; B.A. 1988, University of California, Berkeley. The author would like to thank the attorneys, legislative staff members, police officers and personnel,
journalists, and police practices specialists who so generously contributed their time and written documents to assist the writing of this Note. Special thanks to John Crew, Robin Toma,
Alan Gordon, Frank Saunders, Irene Rapoza, Bert Terreri, Karol Heppe, Carol Watson, Sarge
Holtzman, A.J. Kutchins, Susan Rubenstein, and John Houston Scott for their valuable feedback and clarifications. Finally, many thanks to Peter Mallios, Tony Ratner, and Teresa Foss
for their continual support of this project.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Section 1983 reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
2. See generally MICHAEL AVERY & DAVID RUDOVSKY, POLICE MISCONDUCT: LAW
AND LTGATION § 2.2 (2d ed. 1992) (detailing scope of federal civil rights acts).
3. Section 1983 originated in the Ku Klux Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1873).
One purpose of the Act was to "afford a federal right in federal courts because, by reason of
prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the
... rights... guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by the state agencies." Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961).
4. AVERY & RUDOVSKY, supra note 2, § 4.5, at 4-10; Irving Joyner, Litigating Police
Misconduct Claims in North Carolina, 19 N.C. CENT. L.J. 113, 143-44 (1991); see also infra
notes 19-20, 26-27 and accompanying text.
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conduct are minorities without financial resources, only a small percentage of police brutality incidents become lawsuits. 5 Those victims who
are able to get legal representation face a long and arduous litigation
process, because police departments rarely settle section 1983 suits. 6 Sec-

ond, the Supreme Court has severely limited the ability of plaintiffs to
enjoin a particular police technique, even one that frequently results in
the use of excessive force. 7 Third, juries are more likely to believe the
police officer's version of the incident than the plaintiff's. Often there are8
no witnesses, or each side has an equal number of supporting witnesses.
For a variety of sociological and psychological reasons, juries do not
want to believe that their police officers are bad people or liars. 9 Thus,
plaintiffs rarely win absent help from independent corroborative witnesses or physical evidence.10
In spite of numerous impediments, civil rights lawyers continue to
bring section 1983 suits because they view such actions as an important
tool to address police brutality, and believe that police misconduct would
be worse without the law suits.11
This Note will explore the effectiveness of section 1983 suits in deterring police officers from overstepping the bounds of their power. Section II presents the preliminary obstacles to bringing and winning a
5. See AVERY & RUDOVSKY, supra note 2, Introduction; see also infra notes 12-13, 18
and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
7. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111-13 (1983); Rizzo v. Goode, 423
U.S. 362, 373-81 (1976); see also infra notes 79-89 and accompanying text.
8. See AVERY & RUDOVSKY, supra note 2, § 4.5; see also infra note 68 and accompanying text.
9. See AVERY & RUDOVSKY, supra note 2, § 12.1 (discussing jury selection); see also
infra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
10. See AVERY & RUDOVSKY, supra note 2, § 11.3(b)(3), at 11-30 ("Most experienced
lawyers handling police misconduct cases expect to lose more cases than they win, even though
the cases are well prepared and competently presented."); see also infra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
11. See AVERY & RUDOVSKY, supra note 2, Introduction; Telephone Interview with Jim
Chanin, Attorney in Berkeley, California (Jan. 23, 1992) ("[Police misconduct] would be
worse without § 1983."); Interview with John Crew, Staff Attorney, American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU), in San Francisco, Cal. (Jan. 8, 1992) ("Lawsuits are one tool, but alone won't
solve the problem of police brutality."); Telephone Interview with Richard "Terry" Koch,
Attorney in Berkeley, California (Jan. 10, 1992) ("It is very important to bring these suits even
though they are hard to win. We will lose ground if [they are] not brought again and again.
We have nothing else now, so we must try to win these suits.") Telephone Interview with Osha
Neumann, Attorney in Berkeley, California (Jan. 24, 1992) ("Lawsuits alone do not generally
bring about institutional change or control police behavior, but they are one important element."); Telephone Interview with Dan Stormer, Attorney in Los Angeles, California (Jan. 27,
1992) ("[Section 1983 suits are] a great vehicle foremost for poor people and people of color to
get justice. We need to keep this available to them."); Telephone Interview with Carol
Strickman, Attorney in Oakland, California (Jan. 10, 1992) ("[Section 1983 suits] are one tool.
They aren't the total answer, but they are an important tool nonetheless.").
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section 1983 suit. Section III examines the deterrent effect of these suits
and also looks at the flaws in the institutional components responsible for
controlling violence within police departments. Section IV presents proposed solutions to curb the repeated pattern of police brutality.
Based primarily on an examination of section 1983 suits in California, this Note addresses the topic from the perspectives of both law and
social science. Case law does not tell much of the story, since deterrence
cannot be measured in judicial opinions. Thus, much of the material for
this Note was obtained from interviews with attorneys, legislators, city
officials, police officers, and journalists who are knowledgeable in the
field of police misconduct.
This Note does not claim to be a scientific or statistical study of
deterrence. Rather, it addresses the politics and practice of police misconduct suits brought under section 1983, based on the recent experiences of those who are most intimately involved with the problem of
police brutality and the litigation of section 1983 suits. The glaring
truth, revealed from the interviews and research, is that the cycle of police abuse continues virtually unchecked in many California cities. The
numerous legal and administrative checks on police power have failed,
and thus, in California, the same attorneys are suing the same officers,
repeatedly, with the only change being the plaintiff's name.
II.

The Difficulties of Bringing a Suit Under Section 1983

When bringing a suit under section 1983, a victim of excessive force
faces the difficult tasks of first, finding an attorney, and then, winning the
case. To be successful, the victim and the attorney must overcome financial, procedural, and evidentiary obstacles.
A.

Obstacle #1:

Finding an Attorney

Most victims and witnesses lack both credibility and financial resources. A victim of excessive force will therefore have difficulty finding
an attorney to take the case unless there are credible witnesses, tangible
12
evidence, or severe brutality.
12. See AVERY & RUDOVSKY, supra note 2, § 4.5, at 4-9 ("Experience has shown that

unless the plaintiff has suffered substantial injuries, recovery, if any, will be very small.");
Edward J. Littlejohn, Civil Liability and the Police Officer: The Need for New Deterrents to
Police Misconduct, 58 U. DET. J. URB. L. 365, 369 (1981) ("[P]rivate attorneys [represent]
only those clients ... who [experience] severe brutality."); Interview with Sarge Holtzman,
Attorney, in San Francisco, Cal. (Jan. 30, 1992) ("[It is] impossible to pursue most cases because there are no witnesses."); Telephone Interview with Osha Neumann, supra note 11; Telephone Interview with Tito Torres, Attorney in San Francisco, California (Jan. 23, 1992)
("There is a real lack of lawyers willing to take cases that don't involve serious bodily injury or
killing. If more lawyers would take these low level cases, there might be some accountability
because it would address the violence before it escalates to a greater degree.").

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44

The typical victim of excessive force is a young African-American
or Latino male, from a poor neighborhood, often with a criminal record.1 3 Gays and lesbians, transients, drunks, and criminal arrestees are
also common targets of abuse. 14 On average, police abuse is not directed
at white citizens; 15 when an officer unknowingly beats a person with
political influence, the city is likely to settle the suit to minimize the
16
embarrassment.
Unfortunately, these typical victims do not make sympathetic plaintiffs, so their chances of recovery are small, and attorneys have little incentive to take their cases. 17 Since few plaintiffs can afford counsel and
most suits are taken on a contingency basis,1 8 an attorney undertakes an
13. Joyner, supra note 4, at 113 ("Blacks and other minorities are more apt to be victims
of police violence."); Telephone Interview with Oliver Jones, Attorney in Oakland, California
(Jan. 8, 1992) ("The persons most likely to be victims are young minorities ....
");Telephone
Interview with Frank Saunders, California-based expert witness and former police officer who
has testified at over 500 trials (Jan. 25, 1992) ("A majority of the plaintiffs are minorities.");
Telephone Interview with Carol Watson, Attorney in Los Angeles, California (Feb. 9, 1992)
("The plaintiffs are generally young and poor Black or Latino men."); see also Mark Carriden,
Police Force, A.B.A. J., May 1991, at 25 (discussing police misconduct suit by baseball Hall of
Famer Joe Morgan, in which jurors "believed Morgan was singled out [by police] because he
was black"); Darlene Ricker, Behind the Silence, A.B.A. J., July 1991, at 44, 45 ("Minorities,
and particularly blacks, have complained for years about police abuse in their communities.").
14. WARREN CHRISTOPHER ET AL., REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON
THE Los ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 168-71 (1991) [hereinafter CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT] (stating that gays and lesbians are reported to be common victims of excessive
force); Joyner, supra note 4, at 113 ("In too many instances, the victim of police misconduct is
an individual ... who is a suspect in illegal or questionable activities."); Telephone Interview
with Gordon Greenwood, Deputy Public Defender in San Francisco, California (Mar. 8,
1993) ("Criminal defendants are often targets of police abuse."); Telephone Interview with
Osha Neumann, supra note 11 ("The homeless and people with criminal records are often
targets of abuse.").
15. See Joyner, supra note 4, at 113; Telephone Interview with Oliver Jones, supra note
13. Note, however, that "[w]hites... are also victimized particularly if they advocate unpopular causes or political points of view." Joyner, supra note 4, at 112-13.
16. See Telephone Interview with Dennis Cunningham, Attorney in San Francisco, California (Feb. 13, 1992) ("If your plaintiff is Dolores Huerta, you have a better chance of winning or settling. If the plaintiff has political clout, the city is more likely to pay out.").
17. See Joyner, supra note 4, at 113 (stating that "victims' character has adverse impact"); Littlejohn, supra note 12, at 369 ("When a plaintiff is poor, has minority group status
or is a criminal, jurors are likely to resolve doubts in favor of the police officers."); Telephone
Interview with Sarge Holtzman, supra note 12; Telephone Interview with Osha Neumann,
supra note 11.
18. See Joyner, supra note 4, at 143 ("[M]ost victims cannot afford to pay attorney's
fees."); Telephone Interview with Dennis Cunningham, supra note 16 ("[It is] rare that victims
of misconduct have the money to pay a lawyer."); Telephone Interview with Tito Torres, supra
note 12 ("The economic class who are victims don't have the resources to pay lawyers.");
Telephone Interview with Carol Watson, supra note 13 ("These [police misconduct] cases are
almost exclusively taken on a contingency fee basis."). Note, however, that an attorney can file
for both attorney and expert fees in a § 1983 suit. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (b), (c) (1988 & Supp.
III 1991).
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enormous financial risk when filing a section 1983 suit.19 An attorney
will therefore be hesitant to accept a weak case or a case without signifi20
cant damages.
A second common weakness to a case concerns the plaintiff's witnesses. 2 1 These witnesses often suffer the same credibility problems as
does the plaintiff. Many altercations between police and victims of misconduct occur in poor neighborhoods. Witnesses tend to be friends, family, or acquaintances of the plaintiff, and therefore lack the credibility of

a disinterested party. 22 Such witnesses often have criminal histories as
well. 23 This lack of credible witnesses greatly reduces the chances for
success, and is another reason attorneys will be reluctant to accept a
24
case.
B.

Obstacle #2:

Winning a Section 1983 Suit for Damages

Even if a victim of police brutality finds an attorney to pursue the
claim, winning the suit is a new battle. As the first criminal trial against
the four white police officers who beat Rodney King demonstrated, even
25
videotaped evidence may fail to persuade jurors of the officers' guilt.
"[Police misconduct] is a very difficult area of law, and attorneys lose a
majority of their cases ....-26
19. See Joyner, supra note 4, at 143 ("The attorney... should be prepared to 'front' the
litigation costs."); Telephone Interview with Osha Neumann, supra note 11 ("It is costly to sue
the police, so unless major damages are involved, it is hard to get representation.").
20. See Joyner, supra note 4, at 143 ("The inability to 'front' [litigation] costs causes
many attorneys to refuse to accept police misconduct cases."); Telephone Interview with Dennis Cunningham, supranote 16 ("If [there is] no serious injury, it usually isn't possible to get a
lawyer because the lawyer won't get paid."); Telephone Interview with Frank Saunders, supra
note 13 ("The success of a suit often depends on the seriousness of the injury."); Telephone
Interview with Tito Torres, supra note 12 ("Not many attorneys will take suits without significant damages. If the payoff is not $50,000 or more, most attorneys can't afford to take the
case, and the police know this.").
21. See AVERY & RUDOVSKY, supra note 2, § 4.5, at 4-8 to 4-9 (discussing necessity of
independent witnesses).
22. Telephone Interview with Carol Watson, supra note 13 ("In many cases the witnesses
are neighbors, friends, or acquaintances of the plaintiff. They are not the most credible
witnesses.").
23. Id. ("Many of [the witnesses] have criminal records since the majority of cases happen in poor neighborhoods.").
24. See AVERY & RUDOVSKY, supra note 2, § 4.5.
25. For a general discussion of the trial verdict, see Richard A. Serrano & Tracy Wilkinson, All 4 in King Beating Acquitted, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 30, 1992, at Al.
26. Telephone Interview with Karol Heppe, Director of Police Watch, an organization in
Los Angeles that provides initial counseling and referrals to victims of police abuse (Feb. 7,
1992); see Telephone Interview with Richard "Terry" Koch, supra note 11 ("These suits are
very tough to win."); Telephone Interview with Dan Stormer, supra note 11 ("Today, it is even
more difficult to prevail in section 1983 suits because the courts are cutting back."); see also
Joyner, supra note 4, at 114 ("[It is] extremely difficult to convince a jury of twelve citizens
that police officers have violated the rights of others."). One San Francisco attorney with
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Technically, "excessive" or "unreasonable" force gives rise to a
cause of action under section 1983.27 As a practical matter, however, it
may be difficult to establish a cause of action based on unconstitutional
excessive force because courts tend to protect police officers. 28
Historically, police officers have been expected to maintain and enforce
the prevailing social order. In short, their job is to keep the peace, to
arrest suspected wrongdoers and to prevent criminal activities. The
judicial protection afforded police officers is based on the presumption
that the use of force is necessary to maintain social
order and to apprehend persons suspected of committing crimes. 29
Satisfying the basic elements of a section 1983 suit can therefore entail
30
overcoming a judge's subtle bias.
Unfortunately, this is not the only hurdle an attorney faces. A
plaintiff's attorney faces numerous other challenges unique to police misconduct suits.
almost twenty-five years of experience handling police misconduct suits states: "The violence
must be pretty bad to get a jury to rule against the police. These cases are very hard to win."
Telephone Interview with Dennis Cunningham, supra note 16.
27. AVERY & RUDOVSKY, supra note 2, at 2-23. The standard for determining whether a
given application of force is unconstitutionally excessive is laid out in Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386 (1989). Note that pre-Graham, the lower federal courts differed in defining the appropriate constitutional standard. AVERY & RUDOVSKY, supra note 2, at 2-26. "Some courts
required a showing of some severity to sustain a section 1983 action." Id. This led to some
"mean spirited decisions." Id.; see, e.g., Owens v. City of Atlanta, 780 F.2d 1564 (11th Cir.
1985) (holding that arrestee who died from being placed in "stretch" hold position in jail cell
was unable to sustain § 1983 claim); Davis v. Forrest, 768 F.2d 257 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding
that beating with flashlights did not "shock the conscience"); Raley v. Fraser, 747 F.2d 287
(5th Cir. 1984) (holding that plaintiff who suffered bruised arms, scraped face, welts on wrists
from handcuffs, and sore throat did not meet the severity requirement to state a cause of
action); Shillingford v. Holmes, 634 F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir. 198 1) (holding that recovery under
§ 1983 requires that injuries be grossly disproportionate to need for action under the circumstances and that the action was malicious); King v. Blankenship, 636 F.2d 70, 73 (4th Cir.
1980) (holding that unjustified infliction of bodily harm upon a prisoner that exceeds force
needed, is maliciously applied, and inflicts injury that gives rise to § 1983 liability); see also
Richard P. Shafer, Annotation, When Does Police Officer's Use of ForceDuringArrest Become
So Excessive as to Constitute Violation of ConstitutionalRights, Imposing Liability Under Federal Civil Rights Act of 1871, 60 A.L.R. FED. 204 (1982).
28. Joyner, supra note 4, at 114; see, e.g., Significant Cases and Developments: Civil
Rights, 35 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 112, 114 (1991) (maintaining that Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals "went out of its way" in Samples v. City of Atlanta, 916 F.2d 1548 (11th Cir. 1990),
to affirm verdict for police officer defendants).
29. Joyner, supra note 4, at 114.
30. Littlejohn, supra note 12, at 415; see also AVERY & RUDOVSKY, supra note 2, § 5.7
(discussing federal judges' increasing antagonism toward civil rights actions, leading to requirement of detailed factual pleading); Ricker, supra note 13, at 46 (judges give leeway to
police officers on trial for brutality).
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(1) Qualified Immunity Defense

In excessive force suits, an officer may raise a qualified immunity
defense, claiming that her actions were based on good faith. 3 1 Some in
the legal profession argue strongly that qualified immunity simply should
not be an issue in excessive force cases. 32 The qualified immunity defense
is proper, for example, when an individual's constitutional rights are violated by an officer acting in good faith under a statute reasonably believed to be valid, but later found unconstitutional. 3 3 By contrast, in

cases involving excessive force, the officer actually denies that he violated
the victim's constitutional rights. "The question [in excessive force
cases] is not whether the force used was justified and necessary; [but] was
it reasonable under the circumstances?" 34 The qualified immunity defense is therefore inappropriate.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not clarified whether the
qualified immunity defense is applicable to excessive force cases. 35 In the
lower federal courts there is confusion: some courts have ruled that qualified immunity is inappropriate, while other courts have allowed this defense. 36 As a result, the first legal battle faced by the plaintiff's attorney
in a suit for excessive force may be to overcome the qualified immunity
defense.
(2) Taking On the Public Entity
Although the individual officer is the actual defendant in most police misconduct cases, the victim of police brutality is, in reality, taking
on the entire municipality. In California, for example, the law mandates
that the city provide the defense and pay any settlement or award. 37 The
31. For a general discussion of the qualified immunity defense, see AVERY & RUDOVSKY,
supra note 2, §§ 7.2-7.11. For cases discussing the qualified immunity defense, see Pierson v.
Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555-57 (1967); Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1120-22 (5th Cir. 1981);
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339, 1347-48
(2d Cir. 1972).
32. AVERY & RUDOVSKY, supra note 2, at 7-28.
33. See id. at § 7.4 ("clearly established" standard).
34. Id. at 7-28.
35. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 399 n.12 (1989).
36. For an extensive list of cases going both ways see AVERY & RUDOVSKY, supra note 2,
at 7-30.
37. See CAL. GOVT CODE § 825(a) (West Supp. 1993). Section 825(a) states, in relevant
part:
If an employee or former employee of a public entity requests the public entity to
defend him against any claim or action against him for an injury arising out of an act
or omission occurring within the scope of his employment as an employee of the
public entity.., and the employee or former employee reasonably cooperates in good
faith in the defense of the claim or action, the public entity shall pay any judgment
based thereon or any compromise or settlement of the claim or action to which the
public entity has agreed.
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city sometimes retains outside counsel in addition to using city attorneys
will hire its
to defend the suit. 38 Occasionally, the police officers' union
39
own counsel to provide additional defense for the officer.
Civil rights attorneys claim that, in general, cities aggressively defend these suits to discourage litigation. 4° Even in cases in which the
evidence in favor of the plaintiff is overwhelming, the city might choose
to take the case to trial. 4 1 The city attorney's office has virtually unlimited resources, 42 and the average suit lasts for many years, 43 costing hun-

dreds of thousands of dollars in fees. 44 The result is an expensive and
difficult battle for civil rights attorneys and plaintiffs.
38. Telephone Interview with Kevin Reed, Western Regional Counsel of the NAACP
Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. (Feb. 5, 1992); Telephone Interview with Robin
Toma, Staff Attorney at ACLU Foundation of Southern California (Feb. 4, 1992).
39. Telephone Interview with Oliver Jones, supra note 13 (noting that in about 10% of
the cases he has handled, the police officers' union has hired co-counsel to defend the officer).
40. Telephone Interview with Jim Chanin, supra note 11 ("Suits are fought strongly, in
general, although now some cases do settle, which is new."); Interview with Sarge Holtzman,
supra note 12 ("The city tends not to settle often so that there's a disincentive for attorneys to
bring these suits."); Telephone Interview with Oliver Jones, supra note 13 ("Cities fight suits
Cities are more
tooth and nail once the internal affairs department has cleared the officer ....
likely to contest police brutality actions than almost anything else."); Telephone Interview
with Kevin Reed, supra note 38 ("Suits are defended vigorously and cities don't settle unless
they have to."); Telephone Interview with Robin Toma, supra note 38 ("These suits are fought
very strongly."); Telephone Interview with Tito Torres, supra note 12 ("A city backs up officers whether they are right or wrong. I have seen suits where the city attorney spent $30,000
to $40,000 defending a suit that could have settled for $5,000.").
41. For example, the City of Richmond took such an approach in one landmark case
with disastrous results for the City. See Carol Benfeil, $3 Million Awarded in Richmond Case,
OAKLAND TRIB., June 4, 1983, at Al, A10 (noting that trial resulted in a three-million-dollar
verdict); Perry Long, Richmond Trial Going to Jury, S.F. CHRON., May 26, 1983 at 3 (stating
that in civil rights case against the city of Richmond, the city brought the case to trial in spite
of substantial evidence of the police officers' and department's liability); Richmond Vetoes Pact
in Cop Brutality Case, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 25, 1983, at 5 (discussing the Richmond City Council's rejection of settlement offers in the case).
42. Telephone Interview with Karol Heppe, supra note 26 ("The city attorney's office has
unlimited resources to fight these suits.").
43. Police misconduct suits may last anywhere from one to five years, depending on
whether they are in state or federal court. See Littlejohn, supra note 12, at 369 ("[T]he likelihood of long delay before trial has been another impediment for bona fide plaintiffs. In large
cities it is not uncommon for civil docket backlogs to extend for two or more years."); Telephone Interview with Oliver Jones, supra note 13 (stating that suits in federal court average
about two years); Telephone Interview with Kevin Reed, supra note 38 (stating that suits
usually last anywhere from two to five years); Telephone Interview with John Houston Scott,
Attorney in San Francisco, California (Jan. 25, 1992) (stating that suits last two to five years);
Telephone Interview with Carol Watson, supra note 13 (stating that federal court suits average
two and one-half years).
44. Telephone Interview with Robin Toma, supra note 38. Robin Toma states that:
Suits are long and cost the ACLU a tremendous amount of money to fight-in the
hundreds of thousands of dollars. For example, in the suit against the Los Angeles
Police Department for illegal spying, dozens of plaintiffs were involved and depositions alone lasted months and costs tens of thousands of dollars in costs and fees.
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(3) Discovery Battles

Discovery battles contribute significantly to the length, cost, and difficulty of section 1983 litigation. 45 A police department generally will
not turn over disciplinary or personnel records unless a court orders it to
do So. 4 6 Attorneys litigating section 1983 suits in state court face a
number of barriers to obtaining these records. Officers' personnel
records are confidential and immune from disclosure. 47 To gain access to
an officer's personnel record containing information about any history of
violence, the plaintiff must show "good cause."' 48 Judges also have discretion to deny these motions if "justice requires . . . [protecting] the
officer or agency from unnecessary annoyance, embarrassment or
'49
oppression."
Showing "good cause" can be difficult; state commissioners, who
hear discovery motions, tend to deny motions, 50 especially those that
have the purpose of proving an officer's history of violence. 5 1 Attorneys
attribute this to the political component-state commissioners are appointed by judges, who are elected officials, and do not want to offend
police departments. 52
I
45. See id. ("City attorneys drag their feet on discovery. For example, the Los Angeles
Police Department got a contempt order for not turning over discovery files in a case involving
the Revolutionary Communist Party."); see also Telephone Interview with Karol Heppe, supra
note 26 ("Discovery is a battle. Lawyers have a tough time getting records of discipline.").
46. Telephone Interview with Lt. Douglas Seiberling, Director of Internal Affairs Division, Richmond Police Department (Feb. 11, 1992); see also Interview with Sarge Holtzman,
supra note 12 (stating that in a taxpayer's suit against the city of San Francisco for a pattern
and practice of police brutality, the city refused to turn over any personnel records.).
47. CAL. PENAL CODE § 832.7(a) (West Supp. 1993). Section 832.7(a) states, in relevant
part: "Peace officer personnel records and records maintained by any state or local agency
... , or information obtained from these records, are confidential and shall not be disclosed in
any criminal or civil proceeding except by discovery pursuant to Section 1043 . . . of the
Evidence Code." Id.
48. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1043(b)(3) (West Supp. 1993). Section 1043(b)(3) states, in relevant part: "The motion [for discovery] shall include... Affidavits showing good cause for the
discovery or disclosure sought, setting forth the materiality thereof to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation and stating upon reasonable belief that the governmental
agency identified has the records or information from the records." Id.
49. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1045(d) (West Supp. 1993). In weighing the evidence, judges
evaluate over ten factors derived from Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653 (N.D. Cal.
1987). For a discussion of the factors, see id. at 663-68.
50. Telephone Interview with Karol Heppe, supra note 26 ("State judges often deny discovery motions.").
51. See Telephone Interview with Karol Heppe, supra note 26 ("Lawyers [in state court]
have a tough time getting records of discipline."); Telephone Interview with John Houston
Scott, supra note 43 ("Judges keep out evidence of police officers' ... history of violence.");
Telephone Interview with Carol Watson, supra note 13 ("State judges are reluctant to grant
access to police records. They are more timid to find good cause than federal judges.").
52. See Telephone Interview with Randy Baker, Attorney in Berkeley, California (Feb.
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In contrast, "[t]he Federal Rules provide for broad discovery.
Under Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 'relevance'
is very loosely construed . . . -53 and thus access to records in federal
court is more readily obtainable.5 4 Moreover, attorneys claim that federal judges are more receptive to plaintiffs' discovery motions, perhaps
because federal judges are appointed for life and are less likely to fear
offending police departments. 5 Consequently, gaining access to disciplinary and personnel records in federal court can be easier.
(4) Interlocutory Appeals

Public entities are allowed to make interlocutory appeals on dispositive motions, such as those that assert a qualified immunity defense.5 6
This one-sided privilege gives the city a tactical advantage and extends
the length and expense of litigation for the plaintiff's attorney.5 7 "Police
misconduct actions can simply be 'piece-mealed to death' by repeated
' 58
appeal through the appellate process before a plaintiff can get to trial."
Interlocutory appeals are yet another component that makes section
1983 suits difficult to pursue.
11, 1992) ("In state court, discovery is more political. The Commissioners do discovery rulings in superior court. They are appointed by judges, who are elected, and they appear to have
a very close relationship with the city attorney's office. The state law of discovery is not substantially different from federal law, so the real difference results from the judges' exercise of
discretion."); Telephone Interview with Dennis Cunningham, supra note 16 ("[State commissioners are] political people."); Telephone Interview with Oliver Jones, supra note 13 ("Discovery is completely up to the judge's discretion."); Telephone Interview with Carol Watson,
supra note 13 ("Discovery depends on how willing the judge is to offend the police
department.").
53. AVERY & RUDOVSKY, supra note 2, § 6.2.
54. Id.
55. Telephone Interview with Randy Baker, supra note 52 ("Federal judges are more
receptive to discovery motions. State courts often will not grant discovery requests ....
There, it's a more political process."); Telephone Interview with Carol Watson, supra note 13
("In federal court, access is quite forthcoming because judges who are not elected have little or
no fear of offending police.").
56. Joyner, supra note 4, at 139; see also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524-30 (1985)
(holding that a denial of qualified immunity is an appealable interlocutory decision).
57. See Joyner, supra note 4, at 139-40 ("The effect of ... the immediate appealability of
the denial of the good faith defense is to allow defendant officers to draw out police misconduct
litigation for years.").
58. Id. at 140. One Northern California attorney recounts a civil rights case he handled
in which the government made three separate appeals before trial, each requiring a hearing in
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Telephone Interview with A.J. Kutchins, Attorney in
Berkeley, California (Jan. 28, 1992). He characterizes two of the appeals as frivolous, primarily aimed at running up costs. Id. The case was filed as a Bivens suit, a judicial cause of action
against a government official for violating an individual's constitutional rights under color of
law. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971). Bivens suits have interchangeable standards and procedures with § 1983 suits. Id.
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(5) Overcoming the Code of Silence
Another major barrier plaintiff's attorneys face is the "code of silence," or the "blue curtain." 59
The code of silence that exists in every profession is even stronger
among police officers out of necessity. You depend on each other in
life and death situations. This brotherhood/camaraderie is a strong
influence.... It is naive to think that cops under sworn testimony will
not lie if caught in a bind. Cops routinely cover up for each other at
60
trial.

While the code of silence exists, it differs from department to department
and is not impenetrable. 61 Indeed, some former officers have observed
a decline in the strength of the code of silence throughout the past
decade.62 Nevertheless, an officer generally will not speak up unless
59. Interview with John Crew, supra note 11 ("The code of silence is a major problem
every attorney faces in these suits."); see also Carol A. Watson, Complaints Meet a Wall of
Silence, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1991, at M5 ("The code of silence, adhered to by any officer who
intends to remain on the job, provides a virtually impenetrable layer of protection for violenceprone officers. It is clear that the officers who beat Rodney Glenn King felt no threat of.
exposure from [those] who stood by and watched."). For a general discussion of the code of
silence, see CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 168-71, and Flint Taylor,
Abusive Conduct and Torture Tactics of Police, 3 POLICE MISCONDUCT & CIV. RTS. L. REP. 7

(1990).
60. Telephone Interview with Frank Saunders, supra note 13; see also, e.g., Beth Barrett
and David Parrish, Few Firedfor Excess Force, L.A. DAILY NEWS, May 5, 1991, at 1, 8
(discussing code of silence within the Los Angeles Police Department); Victor Merina, Morgan
Awarded $540,000 by Jurors,L.A. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1991, at BI (stating that DEA agent supported account of police officer in his testimony at trial, and that eyewitness's testimony contradicted both the officer's and the agent's account).
61. See Telephone Interview with Donald Casimere, former police officer and investigative officer at Richmond Police Commission, Richmond, California (Feb. 7, 1992) ("Officers
are hesitant to talk about other officers. The code of silence exists, but some officers will
always come forward."); Interview with Christopher Lefferts, former police officer who
worked seventeen years at various departments in Santa Clara County, California, in San
Francisco, Cal. (Feb. 4, 1992) ("[Only a] certain percentage of officers do not have the courage
to speak up."); Interview with Herbert L. Terreri, former member of California Highway Patrol who served as a patrolman for seven years at various locations throughout Northern and
Southern California, in San Francisco, Cal. (Feb. 12, 1992) ("Most officers take lying very
seriously and will not risk their jobs for another officer.").
62. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Donald Casimere, supra note 61 ("The code of
silence does exist, but there are some officers who will come forward."); Interview with Christopher Lefferts, supra note 61 ("When I began as a cop in 1973, the code of silence was strong.
I saw it diminish, to some extent, by 1990, when I left law enforcement."); Interview with
Herbert L. Terreri, supra note 61 ("Today, the code of silence is not as strict a code as it once
may have been."); see also Telephone Interview with Frank Saunders, supra note 13. Saunders
notes that
[s]ome changes in the code of silence have resulted, possibly from the Rodney King
episode. For example, in a recent case against [an officer] of the Los Angeles Police
Department, [the officer's] partner changed his story at trial; instead of backing up
[the officer's] account, the partner said he didn't see the event.
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asked; 63 an officer who breaks the code may face ostracism. 64
As a result, officers often perjure themselves, 65 or, at the very least,
say they did not witness the event, rather than speak out against a colleague. 66 When faced with suspected or known perjury, an attorney's
only recourse is to try to discredit or impeach the officer's testimony;
state law provides that police officers are exempt from submitting to lie
detector tests. 67 The existence of the code of silence turns section 1983
suits into credibility contests. As the next section discusses, the police
have the distinct advantage because of jury bias.
(6) Overcoming Jury Bias

Even in the face of seemingly indisputable evidence, such as a videotape, an excessive force suit-civil or criminal-becomes a credibility
63. See CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 169; see also Interview
with Christopher Lefferts, supra note 61 ("When it's not a major incident, many [officers] keep
quiet if not asked."); Interview with Herbert L. Terreri, supra note 61 ("In most of my experience, [an officer doesn't] say anything unless someone asks.").
64. See CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 170; Interview with John
Crew, supra note 11 ("Cops who speak up are often run out of police departments."). See also
Interview with Christopher Lefferts, supra note 61 (Lefferts spoke out against an officer when
he first began his career. Lefferts claims he almost resigned on the night of the incident. After
reporting the incident, it took over a year for many officers in the department to accept him.);
Telephone Interview with Tito Torres, supra note 12 (noting that officers who are
whistleblowers get harassed as a result of speaking out).
65. See Ricker, supra note 13, at 46 (maintaining that officers lie or misstate facts on the
stand; in their enthusiasm to get a guilty verdict against a criminal defendant, district attorneys
often do not challenge the officers, and "judges sigh and turn their heads," creating a court
culture that condones dishonesty and creates an "ends justifies the means" mentality); Telephone Interview with Jim Chanin, supra note 11 ("While the code of silence makes it very
difficult to win cases, they can still be won."); Telephone Interview with Karol Heppe, supra
note 26 ("Officers who complain against another are often blackballed."); Interview with Sarge
Holtzman, supra note 12 ("Police testimony always supports each other-it is orchestrated in
concert. It is very rare to have an officer testify against another. In cases where one officer's
story is too far-fetched, the other officer will just say he didn't see anything."); Telephone
Interview with John Houston Scott, supra note 43 ("If a cop doesn't stand behind another,
who is going to stand behind him next time he, himself, is accused of something?"); Telephone
Interview with Dan Stormer, supra note 11 ("It is the normal course of events for an officer to
bend the truth to fit with the theory of the case [the defense is] trying to come up with."); see
also CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 170 (detailing a recent case where
a judge admonished officers from the bench for giving false testimony).
66. See CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 169; Interview with Sarge
Holtzman, supra note 12 ("In cases where one officer's story is too far-fetched, the other officer
will just say he didn't see anything.").
67. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3307 (West 1980). Section 3307 states in relevant part:
"No public safety officer shall be compelled to submit to a polygraph examination against his
will.... [N]or shall any testimony or evidence be admissible.., to the effect that the public
safety officer refused to take a polygraph examination." Id.
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contest between the plaintiff and the police. 68 The attorney must over70
come jury bias; 69 juries almost always believe the police.
Jurors are often white, middle-class citizens71 who neither have been

victims of police violence nor are likely to have witnessed such violence

in their communities. 72 Rather, juries tend to see police as protecting
them from criminals. 73 The typical citizen wants to believe that the police are not liars capable of such violence. 74 A plaintiff's attorney must
68. See, e.g., Ricker, supra note 13, at 48 (noting that videotape by NBC-TV camera crew
of man being pushed through plate-glass window was insufficient to convict two Long Beach,
California police officers); Richard A. Serrano, Officers Claimed Self-Defense in Beating of
King, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1991, at Al (discussing substantial inconsistencies between officers' report and videotape of the King beating); Sheryl Stolberg, JurorSays Panel Felt King
Actions Were to Blame, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1992, at Al (noting that videotape of Rodney
King beating was insufficient to convict officers); see also Littlejohn, supra note 12, at 369
("Many brutality incidents occur under conditions which result in conflicting testimony about
disputed facts, and frequently turn upon a choice between the veracity of police officers and the
testimony of plaintiffs.").
69. Littlejohn, supra note 12, at 426 ("[Jjury bias is a major factor in police misconduct
cases and is partially responsible for the relative infrequency of plaintiffs' verdicts and low
damage awards.... There is a definite pro-police bias among jurors."); Ricker, supra note 13,
at 48 ("[J]uries are made up of 'just normal people' who 'have a tendency to be skeptical of
people who say they were abused by the police."' (quoting Judge Alex Kozinski, U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit)).
70. Joyner, supra note 4, at 114 ("More often than not, citizens will believe that the
actions of police officers were appropriate, lawful and necessary under the circumstances.");
Littlejohn, supra note 12, at 369, 426 ("Jurors are prejudiced against non-white plaintiffs ....
[W]hen a plaintiff is poor, has minority group status or is a criminal, jurors are likely to resolve
doubts in favor of the police officers."); Charles Burress & J.L. Pimsleur, Protests in Bay
Area-Angry But Mostly Peaceful, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 30, 1992, at A9 (stating that jurors not
inclined to convict police officers); Telephone Interview with Karol Heppe, supra note 26 ("It
is a big task to overcome jury bias. Attorneys lose a majority of their cases because juries don't
want to believe that police lie."); Telephone Interview with Herbert L. Terreri, supra note 61
("Juries generally believe cops.").
71. See Marsha Ginsburg, Jurors Say King Brought Cops' Assault Upon Himself, S.F.
EXAMINER, Apr. 30, 1992, at Al, A19 (averring that jury of mainly whites in a white suburban community will view blacks differently than will blacks); Stolberg, supra note 68, at Al,
A23. See also Richard A. Serrano & Carlos V. Lozano, Jury Pickedfor King Trial;No Blacks
Chosen, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1992, at A19 (profiling jurors in first trial of police officers who
beat Rodney King).
72. Telephone Interview with Oliver Jones, supra note 13 ("Police act differently with
different groups. Most middle-class whites perceive the police differently because they have
had no experience with police violence.").
73. See Henry Weinstein & Paul Lieberman, Location of Trial Played MajorRole, Legal
Experts Say, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1992, at A18 (stating that jurors from Simi Valley view
police as protectors); Winning andLosing Tactics in the Case, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 30, 1992, at
A8 (same).
74. Ricker, supra note 13, at 45; Telephone Interview with Karol Heppe, supra note 26
("Juries don't want to believe that police lie."); see, e.g., Verdict Outrages Bradley But He
Decries 'Senseless Anger', S.F. CHRON., Apr. 30, 1992, at Al, A8 (stating that some people
were satisfied with not guilty verdict in first trial of officers who beat Rodney King, and that
police officers who beat King did what they were trained to do).
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overcome enormous psychological obstacles to convince a typical jury
that a police officer used excessive force.
State court juries tend to be more ethnically and culturally diverse
and generally have less of a bias in favor of police. 75 In contrast, federal
district court juries are drawn from a larger geographic area, which accounts for the more suburban, white, middle-class makeup. Thus, some
attorneys bypass section 1983, and instead sue under state tort theories to
prevent removal to federal court. 76 Even though an attorney loses the
federal court discovery advantage when filing in state77court, federal jury
bias is so powerful that it can be worth the tradeoff.
Jury bias also affects punitive damage awards. Even if the jury finds
for the plaintiff, it is often reluctant to impose punitive damages. 78
C.

Obstacle #3:

Obtaining an Injunction

In addition to or instead of damages, a plaintiff suing under section
1983 may seek to enjoin the particular conduct that caused the injuries.
A plaintiff's chances of obtaining an injunction are minimal because the
United States Supreme Court has limited the availability of injunctive
relief to victims of excessive force. 79 First, the Supreme Court in Rizzo v.
Goode80 denied injunctive relief to private groups and individuals who
had documented evidence of pervasive abuse by Philadelphia police officers. 8 1 The Court set a strong precedent in Rizzo when it held that
federal court intervention in police administration was a violation of federalism and exceeded the injunctive powers afforded by 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.82
A few years later, in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,8 3 the Supreme
Court further narrowed the injunctive relief available to plaintiffs suing
under section 1983. In Lyons, a plaintiff who had been choked into unconsciousness by a Los Angeles officer sought to enjoin police use of a
chokehold. 84 At the time Lyons was decided, the chokehold had caused
75.

See, e.g., Weinstein & Lieberman, supra note 73, at A18 (move of first King trial to

white, middle-class neighborhood influenced verdict for defendant police officers).
76. Telephone Interview with Tito Torres, supra note 12.
77. Telephone Interview with Randy Baker, supra note 52. The jury bias in the Simi
Valley trial of the four police officers who beat Rodney King exemplifies the influence of jury
bias on the outcome. See Weinstein & Lieberman, supra note 73, at A18.
78. Telephone Interview with Richard "Terry" Koch, supra note 11 ("The defense counsel usually conveys to the jury that the police officer cannot, on his salary, afford punitive
damages. They are sympathetic to the officer and rarely grant punitives.").
79. For a discussion of efforts to obtain injunctive relief through § 1983, see PAUL HOFFMAN ET AL., ON THE LINE: POLICE BRUTALITY AND ITS REMEDIES 12-13 (1991).
80. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
81. See id. at 366-77.
82. See id. at 377-81.
83. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
84. Id. at 95.
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the deaths of over a dozen persons;8 5 by 1991, twenty-seven people had
died as a result of this restraint technique.8 6 The Court dismissed the
suit, holding that in order to have standing to sue for an injunction, the
plaintiff must show that he is likely to be a future victim of that same
87
technique.
The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund is trying to narrow the scope of this decision and reopen injunctive relief for victims of
excessive force. 88 As it stands today, however, section 1983 suits for injunctive relief remain very difficult to win because of the Supreme
Court's decisions in Rizzo and Lyons. 9

III. The Effect of Section 1983 Suits as a Deterrent
Section 1983 suits generally do not deter abusive police behavior, 90
except in rare instances when there is either a large award, media attention, or both. 91 This lack of deterrence comes about because "[m]any
officers lose nothing as a result of being sued. It costs them nothing fi85. Id. at 100.
86.

HOFFMAN ET AL., supra note 79, at 13.

87. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105-10.
88. See Thomas v. County of Los Angeles, No. CV 90-5217 TJH (Ex) (C.D. Cal. Sept.
23, 1991) (order granting preliminary injunction); Telephone Interview with Kevin Reed,
supra note 38 ("The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund and fourteen civil rights
attorneys have filed Thomas v. County of Los Angeles to try to deal with the comity and federalism [issues] established by Rizzo and Lyons."). The Thomas suit challenges the Los Angeles
Sheriff's Department's brutality and abuse of the residents of Lynwood, a South-Central Los
Angeles community. The Department's actions include: unjustified beatings, killings, shootings, pointing weapons at residents' heads, "trashing" houses during searches, humiliating
families by making them stand outside in their underwear during a search, forcing victims to
put their hands and faces on hot hoods of police cars during an arrest, racial slurs, and violence during arrest. Id.
89. Telephone Interview with Robin Toma, supra note 38.
90. See, eg., Telephone Interview with Randy Baker, supra note 52 (no deterrence because lack of economic incentive and because suits have no impact on promotion); Telephone
Interview with Oliver Jones, supra note 13 (stating that suits generally do not have any effect
on officers unless the suit gets publicity); Telephone Interview with Kevin Reed, supra note 38
("The amounts paid year after year by the city for these suits evidences that there is no deterrent."); Telephone Interview with Dan Stormer, supra note 11 ("Nickel and dime suits don't
have much impact."); Telephone Interview with Tito Torres, supra note 12 ("I used to think
there would be a deterrent. There isn't any. These suits just compensate the plaintiff."); Telephone Interview with Carol Watson, supra note 13 ("The hope that many of us had [that many
suits would bring a change in conduct] has not borne fruit."); see also Littlejohn, supra note 12,
at 426-30 (detailing ineffectiveness of judicial remedies in deterring police misconduct).
91. See Telephone Interview with Osha Neumann, supra note 11 ("Big suits that result in
change are the exception rather than the rule."); Telephone Interview with Frank Saunders,
supra note 13 ("Deterrence is only a cumulative result. A department must be hit a lot and
hard for it to start changing."); Telephone Interview with Dan Stormer, supra note 11 ("Deterrence is determined by the lawlessness of the public entity and the amount of the award."); see
also infra notes 257-268 and accompanying text.
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nancially, it never results in discipline, it has no effect on promotion, and
it does not affect the way officers are regarded by their peers and superiors."' 92 Moreover, the threat of a lawsuit is minimal; "only a small mi'93
nority of abuses will ever end up in a lawsuit and the police know that.
In addition, the process of litigation is relatively painless for police
officers because the city attorney assumes their defense. For the most
part, officers are not involved in the litigation except for depositions and
trial testimony. 94 Officers rarely show much concern, even in wrongful
death suits, and uniformly approach suits with the attitude that they had
a right to do what they did.9 5 Some officers even treat the suits as a
joke.96 Thus, the cycle continues: attorneys sue the same officers over
and over, and the officers are back on the street the next day while the
taxpayers bear the costs.
A.

The Prevalence of Repeat Offenders

Throughout the United States, the police officers who are sued for
brutality are often repeat offenders. 97 "Patterns do exist. It is common
for attorneys to have cases against officers with histories of violence.
These are not isolated incidents of violence. Officers have a pattern of
escalation of violence. It starts with a little violence as a rookie, and then
92. Telephone Interview with Oliver Jones, supra note 13; see also Bill Wallace, Jordan to
Testify in Lawsuit Accusing 3 S.F Cops of Beating, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 27, 1992, at A22 (discussing histories of violence of certain San Francisco police officers who are currently being
sued in civil court).
93. Telephone Interview with Osha Neumann, supra note 11.
94. See Telephone Interview with Lt. Thomas P. Donohoe, Director of San Francisco
Police Department Legal Division (Feb. 10, 1992) ("Officers do not usually know they are
being sued until the case reaches the city attorney's office and it's time for them to go to a
deposition or to meet with the city attorney."); Telephone Interview with John Houston Scott,
supra note 43 ("The officers are involved in the process only at trial and depositions."); Telephone Interview with Dan Stormer, supra note 11 ("The police officers are not much involved
in the suits."); Telephone Interview with Tito Torres supra note 12 (recalling one case in which
officer was not even aware of interrogatory responses filed by city).
95. Telephone Interview with John Houston Scott, supra note 43; Telephone Interview
with Dan Stormer, supra note 11; Telephone Interview with Tito Torres, supra note 12; Telephone Interview with Carol Watson, supra note 13.
96. Telephone Interview with Jim Chanin, supra note 11; Telephone Interview with Oliver Jones, supra note 13; Telephone Interview with John Houston Scott, supra note 43.
97. See, e.g., Flint Taylor, Proofon Police Failure to Discipline Cases: A Survey (pt. 2), 3
POLICE MISCONDUCT & Civ. RTS. L. REP. 39, 42-43, 45, 47 (1990) (discussing repeat offenders in police departments throughout the United States); Officers Acquitted in Videotaped Rodney King Beating, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 30, 1992, at A9 (noting that two out of the four officers
who beat Rodney King had histories of using excessive force); Wallace, supra note 92, at A22
(discussing histories of violence of a few San Francisco police officers currently being sued in
civil court); Bill Wallace, S.F. Pays in Many Suits Against Cops, S.F. CHRON., May 30, 1990, at
Al (discussing repeat offenders in the San Francisco Police Department who are named defendants in numerous lawsuits).
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escalates because no one stops it early on."9 8s Expert witnesses, city personnel, police officers, and attorneys who litigate section 1983 suits observe patterns of recidivism in their own practice and in that of their
colleagues. 99 On occasion, an attorney will even have multiple suits
against the same officer. 1°° Indeed, the prevalence of recidivism is so
great that organizations have begun compiling data bases in order to
identify repeat offenders. 10 '
San Francisco journalist Ruth Keady of the Daily Journal noticed
the cycle of repeated brutality in San Francisco as she covered police
98. Telephone Interview with Tito Torres, supra note 12.
99. Telephone Interview with Randy Baker, supra note 52 (stating that in his three years
of practice, he has seen same officers come up in a number of suits); Telephone Interview with
Donald Casimere, supra note 61 (noting that Richmond Police Commission sees the same
officers named in complaints); Telephone Interview with Dennis Cunningham, supra note 16
(stating that he observed many repeat offenders in San Francisco and other cities in which he
practiced); Telephone Interview with Karol Heppe, supra note 26 (stating that many repeat
offenders exist in the Los Angeles Police Department); Telephone Interview with Oliver Jones,
supra note 13 (stating that there are repeat offenders in every department); Telephone Interview with Richard "Terry" Koch, supra note 11 (stating that he knows of repeat offenders in
the San Francisco Police Department); Telephone Interview with Irene Rapoza, Senior Administrative Analyst, Office of Citizen Complaints, San Francisco, California (Jan. 28, 1992)
(noting that the San Francisco Office of Citizen Complaints sees patterns of repeat offenders);
Telephone Interview with Kevin Reed, supra note 38 ("A number of officers keep turning
up."); Telephone Interview with Frank Saunders, supra note 13 (recalling that he served as
expert witness in two different cases against same Los Angeles police officer within three-week
period); Interview with Herbert L. Terreri, supra note 61 (stating that he knew of officers in his
department who received numerous complaints for excessive force); Telephone Interview with
Robin Toma, supra note 38 ("There are problem officers who turn up in suits again and
again."); Telephone Interview with Tito Torres, supra note 12 ("For example, one officer had
ten lawsuits against him; moreover, he didn't even know that one suit had settled."); see also
CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 39-48 (identifying forty-four officers as
serious problems, with patterns of violence). Police departments assert, however, that the
numbers should not be oversimplified. Certain officers have more violent beats and make most
of the arrests within the department, thereby subjecting them to situations where they are
likely to be sued more frequently. Telephone Interview with Lieutenant Richard Ehle, Director of Internal Affairs, Oakland Police Department (Feb. 10, 1992); Telephone Interview with
Lieutenant Douglas Seiberling, supra note 46.
100. Telephone Interview with Carol Watson, supra note 13; Interview with Susan Rubenstein, Attorney, in San Francisco, California (Feb. 24, 1992) (recalling when she had two cases
against same San Francisco police officer). Kevin Reed of the NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund claims that after the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund filed a
class action suit against the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, local attorneys started
calling to ask questions about specific officers because the attorneys were handling other suits
against the same officers. See Telephone Interview with Kevin Reed, supra note 38.
101. To aid attorneys, the San Francisco branch of the National Lawyers' Guild, recognizing the patterns of violence among certain officers, is in the process of obtaining funding to
assemble a database of officers who are repeat offenders. See Telephone Interview with Riva
Enteen, National Lawyers Guild, San Francisco, California (Jan. 27, 1992). Similarly, reporter Bill Wallace of the San Francisco Chronicle has assembled his own personal database of
repeat offenders, accumulated through his years of news coverage of police misconduct. See
Telephone Interview with Bill Wallace, Journalist, San Francisco Chronicle (Jan. 28, 1992).
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Ms. Keady, frustrated by city agencies' "mas-

10 3
sive indifference" to police misconduct issues, filed a taxpayers lawsuit
in 1989 against the mayor, the City and County of San Francisco, the

Chief of Police, and the San Francisco Police Commission. 1° 4 The

amended complaint made the following allegations:
Over the course of the past three years, the City has paid over
Three Million Dollars in judgments and settlements to individuals who
have been injured by unlawful police conduct. In these instances, juries have found that police used excessive force or the City Attorney
has determined that the evidence would clearly indicate the excessive
use of force. However, no police officer has been terminated for this
violent and illegal conduct during the course of duty. In the overwhelming majority of instances, the defendants have instituted no disciplinary action whatsoever. In the rare instances in which some form
of disciplinary action was taken, it involved suspension for short period
of time, having no deterrent effect upon the police department. 10 5
Ms. Keady's suit was an attempt to address the prevalence of repeat
offenders and to create a legal deterrent which does not yet exist. 106

Although an original goal of litigation was to deter police brutal-

ity, 10 7 many attorneys have abandoned deterrence as a goal altogether,

realizing that plaintiff compensation is usually the most that can be
gained from a section 1983 suit.1 0 8 This lack of deterrence is attributable
102. Interview with Sarge Holtzman, supra note 12. Holtzman is Ruth Keady's attorney.
See also Wallace, supra note 97, at A6 (discussing the Keady suit).
103. Taxpayers have standing to challenge wasteful spending by a city. CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 526(a) (West 1979). Section 526 states:
An action to obtain a judgment, restraining and preventing any illegal expenditure
of, waste of, or injury to, the estate, funds, or other property of a county, town, city
or city and county of the state, may be maintained against any officer thereof... by a
citizen resident therein.., who is assessed for and is liable to pay, or... has paid, a
tax therein.
104. Interview with Sarge Holtzman, supra note 12. See also Complaint, Keady v. Agnos,
No. 907394 (S.F. Super. Ct., filed June 14, 1989); First Amended Complaint, Keady v. Agnos,
No. 907394 (S.F. Super. Ct., filed Oct. 10, 1991) [hereinafter Keady's First Amended
Complaint].
105. Keady's First Amended Complaint, supra note 104, at 3. The Superior Court dismissed the suit on demurrer in 1992. The appellate court upheld the trial court's ruling. See
Keady v. Agnos, No. A056428, slip op. (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 1993). The court reasoned that
"the complaint fail[ed] to identify any specific expenditure of funds designated for any particular project or function plaintiff [sought] to have enjoined." Id. at 5. Thus, "the general Complaint about the conduct of the Police Department [was] not a basis on which [the court of
appeal was] going to appoint itself chief of police." Id. at 6. Furthermore, the court reasoned
that the record lacked specific facts and reasons to support plaintiff's claim. Id
106. Interview with Sarge Holtzman, supra note 12.
107. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651 (1980) ("Moreover, § 1983 was
intended not only to provide compensation to the victims of past abuses, but to serve as a
deterrent against future constitutional deprivations, as well.").
108. Telephone Interview with Karol Heppe, supra note 26; Telephone Interview with
Oliver Jones, supra note 13; see also Telephone Interview with Tito Torres, supra note 12 ("To
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to a variety of factors that, when combined, create an environment in
which there is no economic or professional incentive for an officer to
change violent habits.
B. Problem #1:

No Economic Incentive Exists

Officers have no economic incentive to change their behavior since a
civil suit has no financial impact on them. As provided by statute, the
city pays for the defense and for any settlement or judgment; the officer is
only required to cooperate in good faith. 0 9
Punitive damages previously were the only way to affect the police
officer economically.1 10 The law changed in 1985, however, and a city
can now pay the punitive damages imposed on the officer.' Under the
revised statute, city officials are given discretion to determine whether the
officer acted in good faith, despite the jury's finding that the officer acted
with malice. 1 12 If city officials decide that, in their opinion, the officer
acted "in good faith, without actual malice," then the city can opt to pay
the punitive damages.1 13 In essence, this law gives the public entity the
right to disregard completely a jury finding of malice with its own discretionary evaluation.
As a result, cities will likely choose to pay punitive damages because
officers may otherwise sue the city for poor representation or conflict of
have a deterrent effect, the litigation must hurt something other than this abstract [city] monetary fund."). A lawyer referral service in Los Angeles called Police Watch was originally
established with the goal of deterring police misconduct through litigation. Telephone Interview with Karol Heppe, supra note 26. According to Director Karol Heppe, this goal has been
all but abandoned, since their efforts of ten years have not resulted in a decrease in brutality
incidents. IdL
109. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 825 (West Supp. 1993).
110. See id Section 825 previously stated: "Nothing in this section authorizes a public
entity to pay such part of a claim or judgment as is for punitive or exemplary damages." CAL
GOV'T CODE § 825 (West 1980), amended by CAL GOV'T CODE § 825 (West Supp. 1993).
Section 825 was amended in 1985 and has added:
(b) [A] public entity ... is authorized to pay that part of a judgment that is for
punitive or exemplary damages if the governing body of that public entity, acting
in its sole discretion, finds all of the following:
(I) The judgment is based on an act or omission of an employee or former employee acting within the course and scope of his or her employment as an
employee of the public entity.
(2) At the time of the act giving rise to the liability, the employee or former
employee acted, or failed to act, in good faith, without actual malice and in
the apparent best interests of the public entity.
(3) Payment of the claim or judgment would be in the best interests of the public
entity ....
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 825 (West Supp. 1993).
111. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 825 (West Supp. 1993).
112. Id.
113. Id.
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interest. 114 Consequently, police officers have absolutely no economic incentive to stop their violent behavior, since they are fully insulated from
the financial effects of a lawsuit. "Instead, the taxpayers keep paying
large amounts of money and the brutality continues." 1 15
C. Problem 4#2: Lack of External Pressure on Police Departments to
Regulate Misconduct
While police officers' financial insulation from suits is a contributing
factor, the lack of external pressure on police departments to change patterns of violence is primarily responsible for the endless cycle of violence.1 16 In general, government, politicians, and the public
put very
117
little pressure on police departments to curb misconduct.
(1) Lack of Public Pressure

Until recently, there has been little public pressure for police reform. 18 Critics claim that the white, mainstream society has generally
been unconcerned with the prevalence of police brutality. "Minorities,
and particularly blacks, have complained for years about police abuse in
their communities. So long as it remained in those communities, out of
the public eye, it was unofficially tolerated as the price we pay for maintaining law and order.'119
114. Interview with Sarge Holtzman, supra note 12; Telephone Interview with John Houston Scott, supra note 43. According to Los Angeles attorney Carol Watson, the change in
§ 825 to allow the city to pay punitive damages came about because a city in Southern California lobbied to pick up the punitive damages of three officers who were found liable in a civil
suit for brutality. Telephone Interview with Carol Watson, supra note 13.
115. Interview with John Crew, supra note 11; Wallace, supra note 97, at A6 ("Losing
lawsuits is unlikely to deter errant officers from future misconduct."); see also Telephone Interview with Jim Chanin, supra note 11; Telephone Interview with Carol Strickman, supra note
11; Telephone Interview with Tito Torres, supra note 12.
116. Telephone Interview with Jim Chanin, supra note 11; Telephone Interview with Dennis Cunningham, supra note 16; Telephone Interview with Karol Heppe, supra note 26; Telephone Interview with Oliver Jones, supra note 13; Telephone Interview with A.J. Kutchins,
supra note 58; Telephone Interview with John Houston Scott, supra note 43; Telephone Interview with Dan Stormer, supra note 11; Telephone Interview with Carol Watson, supra note 13.
117. See infra notes 118-142 and accompanying text.
118. See, e.g., Richard A. Serrano, Cops in Beating Acquitted on 10 of the 11 Counts, S.F.
CHRON., Apr. 30, 1992, at Al, A16 (stating that the Rodney King beating brought about
unprecedented moves to reform police department and forced Los Angeles to finally examine
race relations).
119. Ricker, supra note 13, at 45; see also Vincent Bugliosi, No Justice, No Peace, PLAYBoy, Feb. 1993, at 67, 68 (" 'From rural America to America's big cities, police brutality has
been and continues to be pervasive in the Black and Latino Communities.'" (quoting Steven
Hawkings, assistant counsel at NAACP Legal Defense Fund, New York, N.Y.)); Peter
Fimrite, Cop Brutality Called Routine in Flatlands, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 9, 1991, at A23
("[Cases of harassment and excessive use of force [against black residents] are routine and
pervasive in the Oakland flatlands ....
");Pearl Stewart, Oakland Groups Charge Police Brutality, S.F. CHRON., July 24, 1991, at A15 (reporting that Oakland community groups accused
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The public's resolve to control the police has been further eroded by
increases in crime. Effective control of the police requires organized popular pressure.1 20 Such popular pressure is unlikely, however, when the
public is primarily concerned with being protected from criminals.
Instead,
the public's fear of crime has given the police carte blanche to 'control
the streets and enforce the status quo.' This has led to an 'institutional
toleration of police abuse.' In essence... the courts have 'legitimized
have the proclivity for
police misconduct.' . . . 'The few cops12 who
it as well.' 1

violence have the license for
(2) Lack of PoliticalPressure

There is also a lack of political will to do something about excessive
force. Politicians do not want to be branded as against law and order
and, thus, will rarely speak out against the police. 122 Instead, politicians
"tend to respond to police and community concerns about drugs, street
violence, and crime. If politicians attack police techniques, the police
123
turn around and blame the crime problem on the politicians."
Politicians who attempt to address police misconduct face strong
resistance from other governmental bodies and from police officers' unions. 124 "The police unions have become a deeply entrenched special interest [group], able to bend public policy their way and wear down even
the most formidable opponent .... 'Nothing gets through, or signed into
law, without their stamp of approval.' "125 The unions feel that civilians
should not be involved in scrutinizing the police, 126 and oppose measures
police department of engaging in brutality against citizens, particularly black males who fit
drug-dealer or gang-member profiles); Telephone Interview with Oliver Jones, supra note 13.
120. Telephone Interview with Osha Neumann, supra note 11.
121. Ricker, supra note 13, at 46 (quoting David Rudovsky, The CriminalJustice System
and the Police, in THE POLrrIcs OF LAW (1982)); see also Winning and Losing Tactics in the
Case, supra note 73, at A8 ("Legal experts said that the jurors [in the Rodney King trial] may
have reached their not-guilty verdicts based on their pre-existing attitudes that favor police and
fear crime.").
122. Tom Dresslar, Money Maintains Order in Legislature,L.A. DAILY J., June 15, 1992,
at 7.
123. Telephone Interview with Osha Neumann, supra note 11; see also Dresslar, supra
note 122, at 7; Dan Walters, Comment: Unions, Officials Have a Deal, LAKE Co. RECORD
BEE, Feb. 14, 1992, at 4.
124. Dresslar, supra note 122, at 7.
125. Ralph Frammolino, Police Organizations Block Reforms at the State Level, L.A.
TIMEs, Feb. 15, 1992, at Al (quoting Margaret Pena, lobbyist for ACLU).
126. Telephone Interview with Donald Casimere, supra note 61; Interview with John
Crew, supra note 11; see also Taylor, supra note 97, at 41 ("As in other large cities, the San
Francisco Police Officer's Association... has repeatedly fought against civilian review, calling
for the abolition of the [Office of Citizen Complaints (OCC)] and the return of OCC investigations to the police department."); L.A. Chief to Retire in June After All, S.F. EXAMINER, June
8, 1992 (evening ed.), at Al (reporting that Los Angeles Police Chief Daryl Gates criticized
what he called "meddling by politicians in decisions on police promotions").
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such as reform legislation or the establishment of civilian oversight committees. 127 As a result, legislation aimed at reducing police misconduct is
usually defeated. 128
127. Telephone Interview with Donald Casimere, supra note 61; Interview with John
Crew, supra note 11; see also Taylor, supra note 97, at 41; L.A. Chief to Retire in June After
All, supra note 126, at A13 (reporting that Los Angeles Police Chief Daryl Gates opposes
reform legislation).
128. Recent examples of state legislation that tried to address police misconduct but were
defeated include the following: (1) California Senator Art Torres, Chair of the now dissolved
California Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Peace Office Conduct, proposed a bill in 1992 to
address numerous police misconduct issues. See Cal. S. 1335, 1991-92 Reg. Sess. (1992). The
bill provided, inter alia, that: (a) standardized citizen complaint forms are to be created and
used by all law enforcement agencies; (b) each county is to create an office of citizen complaint,
headed by an ombudsperson; (c) the ombudsperson is required to send citizen complaints involving felonious acts by peace officers directly to the Attorney General's office; (d) the Attorney General is to investigate these complaints and determine within 180 days whether criminal
indictment is warranted; (e) if the Attorney General decides not to file an indictment, she is to
file a written finding explaining the decision not to prosecute, which would be a public record
and would be sent to the complainant; (f) the Department of Justice is to maintain a central
data index of citizen complaints; (g) each law enforcement agency is to adopt a written policy
prohibiting the use of excessive force, and to submit a copy of its written policy to the Department of Justice; (h) training courses for law enforcement officers are to include instruction on
racial and cultural diversity. Id. The bill died in the Senate Appropriations Committee on
July 8, 1992. CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, SENATE WEEKLY HISTORY, No. 305, 1991-1992
Regular Session, at 365 (Oct. 9, 1992).
(2) California Assembly Member Marguerite Archie-Hudson and Senator Diane Watson proposed bills in 1991 that would have required police officers to report other officers who illegally
beat or assaulted individuals. Cal. A. 1114, 1991-92 Reg. Sess. (1991); Cal. S. 513, 1991-92
Reg. Sess. (1991). Failure to report would have been a misdemeanor. Id. Governor Pete
Wilson vetoed the bills. See Letter from Pete Wilson, Governor of California, to members of
the California Assembly (Oct. 14, 1991) (on file with author); Letter from Pete Wilson, Governor of California, to Members of California Senate (Oct. 14, 1991) (on file with author). The
bill was reintroduced by Assembly Member Archie-Hudson in 1992. Cal. A. 2340, 1991-92
Reg. Sess. (1992). The bill passed in the Senate and the Assembly in August 1992, but was
vetoed by Governor Wilson on September 30, 1992. CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, ASSEMBLY
WEEKLY HISTORY, No. 308, 1991-1992 Regular Session, at 654 (Oct. 9, 1992).
(3) Senator David Roberti proposed two bills, one in 1990 and one in 1991, that would have
(a) prohibited peace officers from using "more force than is reasonable, under the circumstances . . . to effect an arrest, prevent escape, or to overcome resistance"; (b) required law
enforcement agencies to "adopt a written policy prohibiting the use of excessive force," and to
submit a copy to the Department of Justice; (c) required the Department of Justice to maintain
copies of these protocols available for public inspection; and (d) required that police officers
have racial and cultural awareness training. Cal. S. 2690, 1989-90 Reg. Sess. (1990); Cal. S.
1075, 1991-92 Reg. Sess. (1991). Police associations such as the California Highway Patrol
strongly opposed the provisions of the bills. See Letter from Lt. A.R. Jones, California Highway Patrol, to California State Senator David Roberti (May 8, 1991) (on file with author).
Governor Wilson vetoed both bills. LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, JOURNAL
OF THE SENATE, 1989-1990 Regular Session, 1989-1990 First Extraordinary Session, at 8934;
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, 1991 DIGEST OF SIGNIFICANT LEG-

ISLATION 161 (Oct. 1991)
(4) California Senator Ed Davis proposed a bill in 1991 that would have (a) required officers
to intervene when citizens were being subjected to violence, and (b) required officers to report a
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(3) Lack of Local Pressure From City Officials

Police departments are also relatively free from local pressure to
stop brutality. 12 9 For example, the Los Angeles Police Department regularly used excessive force, 130 but the city did nothing to address the problem until forced to by the Rodney King incident. 13 1 This unwillingness
of local officials to confront the issue is not limited to major cities or
conservative governments. Even the liberal Berkeley City Council has
been reluctant to address misconduct. 32 In general, local government
control of the police has been minimal; suits brought by public interest
133
groups are usually the only challenges to repeated police brutality.
Furthermore, city governments approach civil suits against individual officers or the police department defensively, rather than addressing

the larger social issues underlying the suits. 134 Local officials are con-

fellow officer who feloniously beat an individual. Cal. S. 1261, 1991-92 Reg. Sess. (1991).
Failure to adhere to the provisions would have resulted in a felony conviction and loss of
police officer status. Id. The bill was changed in the Senate so that failure to adhere to the
provisions would only be a misdemeanor. Frammolino, supra note 125, at Al. Even with a
watered-down version, the bill was defeated. CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, SENATE WEEKLY
HISTORY, No. 305, 1991-1992 Regular Session, at 318 (Oct. 9, 1992). Police departments and
peace officer associations strongly opposed the bill. Telephone Interview with Charles Fennessey, Legal Consultant, Office of Senator Ed Davis, State Capitol (Jan. 28, 1992); see also Ed
Davis, Response to Peace Officer Opposition to S.1261 (statement Davis sent to peace officer
associations) (on file with author).
129. See Watson, supra note 59 ("City Council members approve settlements and pay
judgments arising out of lawsuits over police beatings, but they rarely raise a whimper about
the huge expenditures of taxpayer money that could have been avoided if they had performed
their oversight duties properly .... [Furthermore,] there is little or no effort to use [citizen
complaints or written lawsuit claims] to monitor police performance."); see also Littlejohn,
supra note 12, at 427. Littlejohn discusses a Connecticut study that found "a disinclination on
the part of some municipalities to discipline their police." The study states:
Whether because municipal officials were generally sympathetic toward police officers, or because they were dependent politically on the police department, or simply
because the plaintiffs in these suits.were not members of a politically significant constituency, the attitude of municipal leaders often appeared to be one of complete
support for law enforcement agencies.
130. Ricker, supra note 13, at 45.
131. Id. at 45-46; The Rodney G. King Beating, L.A. TiMEs, Apr. 30, 1992, at A20, A23
(describing how videotape rocked the city of Los Angeles and brought a year of sweeping
change).
132. Telephone Interview with Osha Neumann, supra note 11.
133. Telephone Interview with Kevin Reed, supra note 38 (giving example of NAACP
Legal Defense Fund suit against the Los Angeles Sheriff for recurrent brutality in the city of
Lynwood); Telephone Interview with Robin Toma, supra note 38 (giving example of ACLU
suit attacking the canine policy of the Los Angeles Police Department which has resulted in
over 900 individuals being bitten in the last 3 years).
134. Telephone Interview with John Houston Scott, supranote 43; see, eg., Wallace, supra
note 97, at A6 (stating that San Francisco City Attorney Louise Renne defended the amount
of money paid out by the City of San Francisco for suits against the police, claiming that
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strained by social, political and economic factors that militate against
any active pursuit of police reform.
From a legal perspective, "a municipality cannot be held liable
under section 1983 on a respondeat superior theory." 135 To sue a city
under section 1983, a plaintiff must prove that the city's failure to train
its officers "amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons
with whom the police come into contact." 136 The Supreme Court has
adopted extremely stringent standards of "fault and causation" that a
plaintiff must satisfy to prove "deliberate indifference." 137 The Court
reasoned:
To adopt lesser standards of fault and causation would open municipalities to unprecedented liability under § 1983 ....

It would also en-

gage the federal courts in an endless exercise of second-guessing
municipal employee-training programs. This is an exercise we believe
the federal courts are ill-suited to undertake,
as well as one that would
138
implicate serious questions of federalism.
Thus, even though city taxpayers bear the costs of individual suits
against officers as a practical matter, cities have very little fear of being
sued for institutionalized brutality among their police forces. Case law
leaves only a scant legal threat to cities, as well as little incentive to curb
officers' violent behavior.
There are also practical reasons why cities fail to address the larger
social issues underlying the suits. City attorneys have a "potential conflict in representing the officer or the city in [a] damage suit while at the
"damage awards in misconduct suits are unrelated to the effectiveness of the police department's disciplinary system"); see also supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
135. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1977).
136. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989); see also Flint Taylor, Proof in
Police Failure to Discipline Cases: A Survey (pt. 1), 3 POLICE MISCONDUCr & Civ. RTs. L.
REP. 25 (1990) (discussing relevance of Canton to pattern and practice suits).
137. Canton, 489 U.S. at 391. City liability under § 1983 "will not be satisfied by merely
alleging that the existing training program for a class of employees, such as police officers,
represents a policy for which the city is responsible." Id. at 389. "That a particular officer
may be unsatisfactorily trained will not alone suffice to fasten liability on the city, for the
officer's shortcomings may have resulted from factors other than a faulty training program."
Id. at 390-91.
Neither will it suffice to prove that an injury or accident could have been avoided if
an officer had better or more training, sufficient to equip him to avoid the particular
injury-causing conduct ....
[A]dequately trained officers occasionally make mistakes; the fact that they do says little about the training program or the legal basis for
holding the city liable.
Moreover, for liability to attach in this circumstance the identified deficiency in
a city's training program must be closely related to the ultimate injury. Thus in the
case at hand, respondent must still prove that the deficiency in training actually
caused the police officers' indifference to her medical needs.
Id. at 391. "[P]ermitting cases against cities.., on a lesser standard of fault would result in de
facto respondeat superior liability on municipalities .... " Id. at 392.
138. Id. at 391-92.
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same time referring the case to the [police] [d]epartment for investigation
..
"..-139
Further, city attorneys claim that any evidence they discover
cannot be disclosed because of attorney-client privilege. 14
City leaders have the power to challenge the police department, but
are hindered by their concerns for their political reputation. They may
be reluctant to admit to problems within city agencies, 141 and they may
be wary of offending the police officers' unions.1 42
In sum, there is little external pressure on the police by the public,
state government officials, or local city officials. This results in minimal
accountability for both officers and departments. As discussed in the
next Section, the problem continues within police departments, where
frequently little or no pressure is put on officers to change their violent
behavior.
D. Problem #3: No Professional Incentive Exists for Officers to Change
Their Violent Behavior
The fact that some police departments place little or no pressure on
police officers to change patterns of violence is greatly responsible for the
cycle of police brutality. As this Section will discuss, internal pressure
may be scant or nonexistent for a variety of reasons: the culture within
the police department; the lack of correlation between civil suits and internal discipline; the lack of correlation between civil suits and promotion; the flawed internal affairs procedures; and the lack of authority
granted to civilian oversight committees.
(1) Lack of Peer and Supervisory Pressure
The overall environment within a police department often puts little
or no pressure on an officer to change violent tendencies. If all three
potential sources of pressure-peers, supervisors, and the chief-respond
to brutality complaints and suits with a defensive, rather than corrective,
attitude, the result is a culture that silently condones violence.
a.

Peer Pressure

In general, police officers' tight loyalty comes into play when an officer is civilly sued or criminally charged for brutality. 143 "Police, as a
139. Taylor, supra note 97, at 42; Wallace, supra note 97, at A6.
140. Taylor, supra note 97, at 42; Wallace, supra note 97, at A6.
141. See, eg., Watson, supra note 13, at M5 ("[Los Angeles] City Council members approve settlements and pay judgments arising out of lawsuits over police beatings, but they
rarely raise a whimper about the huge expenditures of taxpayer money that could have been
avoided if they had performed their oversight duties properly.").
142. See supra notes 124-127 and accompanying text.
143. Telephone Interview with Frank Saunders, supra note 13 ("The department will usually protect the officer."); Telephone Interview with Carol Strickman, supra note 11 ("The
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culture, tend to think of themselves as separate and apart from common
citizens. They feel that others don't have a sense of the realities on the
street. They develop a strong sense of military camaraderie as a way of
coping with the isolation they feel."' 144 Within this culture, officers tend
to "close the circle and bring the wagons around" when one officer is
sued. 145 The mentality within the department becomes "us versus
them," 14 6 and officers dismiss verdicts as the product of emotional
juries.

147

reaction of police departments to these suits is very defensive. There is no deterrence because
departments are more interested in backing each other up and defending."); see, e.g., Patrick
McGreevy, City Opts to Settle 12 Suits, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 7, 1991, at 18 (reporting that
Los Angeles Police Chief Gates issued written statement criticizing the city council's decision
to settle twelve suits facing the City of Los Angeles for police misconduct; Gates stated:
"These kinds of outrageous awards are disheartening to police officers and the entire police
department .... ); Hector Tobar & Leslie Berger, Verdict Greeted With Relief and Elation
Among LAPD Officers, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1992, at A18 (reporting that a majority of Los
Angeles Police officers support verdict from criminal trial of officers who beat Rodney King,
exonerating all four officers of misconduct).
144. Telephone Interview with Osha Neumann, supra note 11; see also Ricker, supra note
13, at 46 (stating that police department culture accepts brutality).
145. See, e.g., Ricker, supra note 13, at 46 (stating that a number of the police officers who
witnessed the Rodney King beating supported their colleagues' actions); Telephone Interview
with Richard "Terry" Koch, supra note 11 ("The police have a 'we versus them' mentality;
and when one of them is under fire, they tend to 'bring the wagons around' and unite against
what they see as the enemy."); Telephone Interview with Osha Neumann, supra note 11 ("Police see lawsuits as an occupational hazard and they commiserate on the issue when it happens."). This mentality was exemplified in 1990, when Dan Silva of the San Francisco Office
of Citizen Complaints blew the whistle on a few police officers in relation to the Dolores
Huerta beating. Francis Achim, the police officer with a history of violence who beat Huerta,
had a paper in his personnel file saying he needed counseling because of stress. Achim's supervisors had removed the paper without informing the internal investigators at the department.
This cover up demonstrates the lack of peer pressure placed on an officer with a violent history. See Taylor, supra note 97, at 41; J.L. Pimsleur, SF Cop Guilty in Document Removal
Case, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 28, 1991, at B6; J.L. Pimsleur, Huerta Case HearingBegins Today in
S.F.-Police Commission to Probe Missing Memo, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 26, 1990, at A4.
146. See, e.g., Tobar & Berger, supra note 143, at A18 (reporting that most Los Angeles
police officers felt vindicated by the not guilty verdict in the trial of the four officers who beat
Rodney King; officers had felt under fire from community since King beating in March 1991);
see also Interview with John Crew, supra note 11 ("Cops always back each other up."); Telephone Interview with Osha Neumann, supra note 11 ("Cops have a sense of being under siege
by lawyers, the city council, the media, etc.. ");Telephone Interview with Carol Strickman,
supra note 11 ("Officers usually retain their colleagues' respect in spite of being sued or disciplined. This stems from 'the ends justify the means' philosophy.").
147. Telephone Interview with Lieutenant Richard Ehle, supra note 99. Lieutenant Ehle
maintains that:
You can't predicate discipline on the outcomes of civil suits because there are not the
same standards of proof, juries and judges historically award bigger awards during
the holidays .... Suits are often determined by the capriciousness of juries and
judges.... Juries and judges have never been to a scene where cops were killed, so it
is easy for them to judge the situation after the fact.
Id.; see also Telephone Interview with Oliver Jones, supra note 13 ("Jury judgments are attrib-
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The code of silence 148 also contributes to a conformist peer environment. 14 9 Officers are afraid or unwilling to challenge a colleague's mis50
conduct, so the peer group comes to accept the use of excessive force.'
This acceptance is passed on to the new officers.151 Through peer pressure, a small number of violent officers can set the tone and ultimately
encourage others. 152 "There is no other way to explain the Rodney King
episode where so many officers stood there doing nothing. There had
developed in Los Angeles a powerful peer group that cheers when you
thump on the bad guys.' 15 3 Once a violence-condoning culture develops,
154
it persists and will be unaffected by litigation.
uted by cops to a misguided jury or a hot plaintiff's attorney."); Telephone Interview with
Osha Neumann, supra note 11 ("Cops feel that others try to second guess their behavior without realizing that they were putting their lives on the line."); Telephone Interview with Frank
Saunders, supra note 13 ("The 'siege mentality' within police departments is one reason why
cops dismiss suits. Cops approach suits with the attitude: They [the juries] don't understand
what our job is and that we have to risk our lives to protect the public.... Cops rationalize
that they had to do what they did."); Interview with Herbert L. Terreri, supra note 61 ("It is
not a good idea for juries of laymen to second-guess cops because they [the laymen] have not
been there and do not understand what the pressures were at the time of the incident. Moreover, the political tide can influence juries.").
148. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
149. See Karen Nikos, Man Awarded $87,000 in '86 LAPD Beating Case, L.A. DAILY
NEWS, Sept. 10, 1991, at 1 (reporting that jurors in U.S. District Court found the Los Angeles
Police Department responsible for brutality by its officers because department condoned a
"code of silence" that encouraged officers to refrain from reporting misconduct). A California
legislative bill that would have imposed reporting requirements on police officers who witness a
colleague's brutality was recently defeated. See supra note 128.
150. Interview with John Crew supra note 11.
151. Telephone Interview with Karol Heppe, supra note 26. Attorney Tito Torres has also
observed widespread acceptance of the use of excessive force:
In many departments I have seen, a Rambo culture develops. Officers who get the
most respect and admiration are those who are able to physically deal with a violent
situation. Women officers who talk down violence are often put down for not dealing
with the situation with physical force .... The field training process is another example of this. The Field Training Officers send in rookies to deal with violent situations
and praise them when they physically subdue a criminal.
Telephone Interview with Tito Torres, supra note 12.
152. Telephone Interview with Dennis Cunningham, supra note 16.
153. Telephone Interview with Tito Torres, supra note 12; see, e.g., Watson, supra note 59,
at M5 ("It is clear that the officers who beat Rodney Glenn King felt no threat of exposure
from the aiders and abettors who stood by and watched. And it is highly unlikely that the
rookie officer would have engaged in such brutal behavior if his training officer had not implicitly shown approval by his silence.").
154. For example, after the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund filed suit
against the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department and individual officers for brutal acts in Lynwood, California, several of the named sheriffs went to Lynwood and harassed certain plaintiffs. The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund was forced to get an injunction to
stop the harassment. Telephone Interview with Kevin Reed, supra note 38. See also Ricker,
supra note 13, at 46 (discussing culture in police department that says violence is acceptable).
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The Chief and Supervisors

The chief and higher-ranking supervisors establish the tone and culture within a police department. 155 If the upper ranks do not enforce
violations of department policy, there will be no curb on officers' miscon156
duct out on the street.
Field Training Officers (FTOs), in particular, have a tremendous influence in defining the "unwritten" department policies. 1 57 The FTOs

work directly with rookies, providing street training. If the FTOs encourage or condone violence, the rookie quickly learns that violent behavior is tolerated. 58 Since opportunities for promotion often are not
155. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 61-62 ("[I]n a quasimilitary organization [such as the Los Angeles Police Department], the leadership has great
power to reduce excessive force and to influence behavior."); Burress & Pimsleur, supra note
70, at A9 (reporting that at time of King verdict, "'police chiefs ... [should] speak out unequivocally that this sort of behavior will not be tolerated in their departments'" (quoting
ACLU attorney John Crew)); Watson, supra note 59, at M5 ("Previous statements by
[L.A.P.D. Chief] Gates-racist, violent and militaristic-set the tone for his troops."); Telephone Interview with Oliver Jones, supra note 13 ("Sergeants and Lieutenants mostly run the
department; they are responsible for maintaining discipline, and they set the tone of the department."); Interview with Christopher Lefferts, supra note 61 ("The tone and culture varies from
department to department, depending on the supervisors and chief."); Telephone Interview
with Kevin Reed, supra note 38 ("[When a] black police officer ... criticized his partner for
picking a fight with a crowd, [t]he partner responded, 'The chief told me to take back the
streets.' "); Interview with Herbert L. Terreri, supra note 61 ("If there's no enforcement of
[departmental rules], by superiors, then there's no curb on officers out on the street.").
156. See Ricker, supra note 13, at 46 (" 'There's no encouragement [for brutality] from the
police department, but there is a lack of discipline and a culture that says that's acceptable.' "
(quoting Philadelphia attorney David Rudovsky)); see also CHRISTOPHER

COMMISSION RE-

supra note 14, at 61-62 (discussing the need for the Los Angeles Police Department
leadership to give priority attention to curbing excessive force and to creating accountability
systems for command officers); Watson, supra note 59, at M5 ("The failure to discipline officers engaged in violence, or who are dishonest about violence ... allow[s] miscreants to be
secure in the knowledge that no penalty will [be] imposed on one who beats a person ....");
Telephone Interview with Dennis Cunningham, supra note 16 ("The older cops teach the
younger ones what is OK [behavior]."); Interview with Christopher Lefferts, supra note 61 ("If
brutality complaints are conscientiously pursued through internal affairs, the likelihood of a
recurrence is greatly diminished."); Telephone Interview with Carol Strickman, supra note 11
("You'll always have some officers in a department who are racist or who do not have respect
for the people they arrest-drunks, homeless people, minorities. If the chief or training supervisors feel the same way, you have a big problem."); Telephone Interview with Kevin Reed,
supra note 38 ("The current state of the Los Angeles Police Department and Sheriffs Department are examples of how brutality continues if it is tolerated in a department."); Interview
with Herbert L. Terreri, supra note 61 ("Departments must make a commitment.... The
problem is that some older guys [supervisors] had norms that violence was OK."); Telephone
Interview with Tito Torres, supra note 12 ("The message must come from the chief to be
effective.").
157. Telephone Interview with Oliver Jones, supra note 13; Telephone Interview with Tito
Torres, supra note 12.
158. See Watson, supra note 59, at M5 ("[I]t is highly unlikely that the rookie officer
would have engaged in such brutal behavior [at the King beating] if his training officer had not
PORT,
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significantly affected by an officer's record of complaints, and are never
affected by lawsuits against the officer,15 9 officers with histories of violence have been promoted to FTO positions. 160 As a result, the next
generation of officers comes to accept violent conduct as the norm.
Likewise, if the chief is not committed to enforcing policies against
violence, the impact is widespread.1 61 Police chiefs typically wield influ-

ence in the conduct of litigation against officers as well as significant influence in promotion and discipline. For example, in San Francisco, the
chief has to approve all settlements in civil cases against officers.1 62 The
San Francisco Police Chief also decides what discipline should be imposed on an officer.1 63 In other cities like Oakland and Richmond, disci164
pline is decided by the chief and by the officer's supervisors.
Additionally, the chief also wields promotional power 165 and can allow
an officer to compete in the civil service process despite the officer's recimplicitly shown approval by his silence. Such conduct perpetuates the corruption that undermines public confidence in law enforcement."); see also Telephone Interview with Christopher
Lefferts, supra note 61 ("If an officer's FTO is lousy, there is poor training ....The FTO has
a lot to do with how a rookie behaves, and can affect the rookie officer's attitudes throughout
his or her career."); Interview with Herbert L. Terreri, supra note 61 ("Your FTO tells you all
the informal rules and has a strong influence on what kinds of values you develop.").
159. See infra notes 177-184 and accompanying text.
160. Interview with John Crew, supra note 11 ("In the 1980s, the ACLU lobbied the San
Francisco Police Department to create a policy that would require that officer complaint
records be examined in cases of promotion to FrO. This change was needed because many
FTOs in San Francisco had histories of violent behavior."); Telephone Interview with Osha
Neumann, supra note 11 (stating that as a member of the Berkeley Police Review Commission,
he has witnessed at least two officers with complaint records promoted to FTOs); Telephone
Interview with Tito Torres, supra note 12 ("In the 1980s, I witnessed a lot of officers with
histories of violence being made into FTOs.").
161. CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 61-62.
162. Telephone Interview with Lieutenant Thomas P. Donohoe, supra note 94.
163. San Francisco Police Department General Order No. P-11, at 2 (July 8, 1986) (on file
with author); Telephone Interview with Irene Rapoza, supra note 99. When the discipline
imposed could be more than ten days of suspension, the San Francisco Police Commission
must handle the case. The police chief, however, makes the first decision in the discipline
process. He decides if charges will be brought. Telephone Interview with Irene Rapoza, supra
note 99; see also Bill Wallace, S.F. Police Watchdog Upholds Few Charges, S.F. CHRON., May
29, 1990, at Al, A4 (discussing complaint and disciplinary procedures).
164. See Oakland Police Department General Order 60-60, at 6 (rev. Apr. 23, 1979); Telephone Interview with Lieutenant Richard Ehle, supra note 99 (stating that recommendations
about discipline are made by the officer's supervisors up the chain of command, and are forwarded to the chief of police for final decision; the city manager must give final approval of the
disciplinary actions); Telephone interview with Lieutenant Douglas Seiberling, supra note 46
(explaining that in Richmond, discipline is decided by a committee of supervisors, the chief,
and Internal Affairs investigating officers).
165. See, e.g., LA. Chiefto Retire in June After All, supra note 126, at Al (reporting that
Los Angeles Police Chief Daryl Gates, threatened to postpone his retirement unless he got his
way with promotions).
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ord. 166 If a police chief does not take a violent record into account in
making these decisions, the culture of violence will persist.
Those chiefs who severely discipline officers for misconduct or who
allow misconduct to affect promotion face low morale and risk losing the
support of the ranks. I67 Consequently, a chief may back up an officer
who should be disciplined. 16 8 The result is open approval and encour169
agement of misconduct.
Thus, the overall environment within a police department plays a
significant role in how officers conduct themselves on the street. If all
three sources of pressure-peers, supervisors, and the chief-respond to
brutality complaints and suits defensively and fail to correct the problem,
the department culture evolves into one that condones violence.
(2) No Correlation Between Civil Suits and InternalDiscipline

Another reason civil suits do not deter misconduct is that the outcome of civil suits has no effect on the discipline imposed upon an officer. 170 Internal affairs personnel and citizen oversight committee
166. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Lieutenant Doug Anderson, Oakland Police Department, Personnel Office (Feb. 6, 1992). To compete in the civil service program for promotion, an officer must have a satisfactory service record. Oakland Chief George Hart, however,
does not want to bar anyone from participating in the promotion process. Thus, his policy is
to allow officers to participate even if they do not have satisfactory service. Chief Hart thinks
the best place to consider an officer's service record is at the end of the process, when Chief
Hart makes the final selection. Id.
167. When San Francisco Police Chief Charles Gain was brought in to clean up the department in the 1970s, his reform efforts made him unpopular with the rank and file; he received a no-confidence vote and was ousted by Mayor Dianne Feinstein in 1980. See Jerry
Carroll, Chief Gain's Bumpy Career as an Outsider, S.F. CHRON, July 6, 1979, at 4; Robert
Popp & George Draper, Gain Upheld Complaints of Riot Brutality, S.F. CHRON, March 21,
1980, at 1, 16; Mark A. Stein, Department Rocked By Scandals; Question Gnaws at S.F-Are
Police Out of Control, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1985, at Al.
168. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 164-65 (discussing
examples of the Los Angeles Police Chief reversing complaint findings of "sustained"); Taylor, supra note 136, at 41 (detailing the San Francisco Police Chiefs failure to discipline officers in the majority of cases during a six-year span); Stewart, supra note 119, at A15
(reporting that when faced with community criticism of the way internal affairs handles cases
of alleged brutality, Deputy Chief Robert Nichilini responded, "We do not tolerate the use of
excessive force any time, anywhere ...

; [h]owever ....

police officers are people and some-

times they have difficulties at home or difficulties with the job.").
169. CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 164-65. For example, in the
highly publicized case involving Dolores Huerta, San Francisco Police Chief Frank Jordan
refused to discipline the officer in spite of an $8.5 millon settlement and in spite of the internal
findings of the Office of Citizens Complaints. Taylor, supra note 97, at 40-41. The Office of
Citizen Complaints (OCC) found that the officer was guilty of unnecessary force, and it passed
its findings on to Jordan for discipline. Mike Weiss, Bedfellows Make Strange Politics, SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 6, 1992, at Fl. When Jordan refused to discipline, the OCC had no formal
power to take action on its own. As a result, the officer was never disciplined.
170. See, e.g., Littlejohn, supra note 12, at 428 (reporting that in the Detroit Police Department, "[t]he civil liability of police officers is not evaluated ... for disciplinary purposes-):

March 1993]

DETERRING POLICE BRUTALITY

members unabashedly admit that they do not consider suits during their
17 1
investigations.
Because internal investigations of complaints are usually completed
within sixty days to twelve months, long before a suit is decided, the
internal affairs and oversight committees can not take lawsuits into account at the time of the investigation. 172 This, however, is merely incidental. Police departments strongly advocate that the outcome of
lawsuits should have no bearing on internal discipline. 173 According to
one police lieutenant: "Even if an officer was exonerated by the internal
affairs investigation and then found liable in a civil suit, this would result
in no change in the internal affairs outcome. We have never opened up
an old complaint as a result of a civil suit.'

74

In accordance with this

Telephone Interview with Lieutenant Doug Anderson, supranote 166 ("Civil suits play no role
in either promotion or discipline. A court judgment is not an appropriate way to evaluate
officers' behavior."); Telephone Interview with Lieutenant Thomas Donohoe, supra note 94
(noting that Legal Division of San Francisco Police Department that handles investigations for
civil suits is entirely separate from the internal investigation of complaints and internal discipline); Telephone Interview with Irene Rapoza, supra note 99 ("The disciplinary process is
entirely separate and unique from the civil suit process. In fact, often I don't even know an
officer is being sued until I read about it in the paper."); Telephone Interview with Lieutenant
Douglas Seiberling, supra note 46 (noting that in the Richmond Police Department, while the
internal affairs investigators work on both civil suits and complaint investigations, there is no
correlation whatsoever between the two). In a Los Angeles suit, the jury found an officer
guilty and awarded the plaintiff $8.75 million in damages. The Los Angeles Police Department's internal affairs department exonerated the officer nonetheless. John Kendall & Amy
Louise Kazmin, Man Shot by Officer Gets $8.75 Million, L.A. TIMES, April 27, 1991, at Bi,
B2; see also, e.g., Taylor, supra note 97, at 41, 43 (noting similar situation in Chicago).
171. See, eg., Telephone Interview with Lieutenant Doug Anderson, supra note 166; Telephone Interview with Lieutenant Thomas P. Donohoe, supra note 94; Telephone Interview
with Irene Rapoza, supra note 99; Telephone Interview with Lieutenant Douglas Seiberling,
supra note 46. In a 1991 suit against the city of Hawthorne, California, the plaintiff's family
was willing to accept a settlement if the police department would agree to fire the officer who
killed their son. The city rejected the offer. Survivors of Man Killed by Police In Hawthorne
Accept $1 Million, L.A. DAILY J., Sept. 20, 1991, at 2.
172. Telephone Interview with Lieutenant Richard Ehle, supra note 99 (sixty days); Telephone Interview with Irene Rapoza, supra note 99 (usually completed within one year); Telephone Interview with Lieutenant Douglas Seiberling, supra note 46 (thirty days).
173. Telephone Interview with Lieutenant Doug Anderson, supra note 166; Telephone
Interview with Lieutenant Thomas P. Donohoe, supra note 94; Telephone Interview with
Lieutenant Douglas Seiberling, supra note 46; see also Declaration of Robert Mann, at 1 (June
3, 1991) (on file with author) (discussing deposition of Los Angeles Sheriff Sherman Block on
December 4, 1990, in Espinoza v. County of Los Angeles). In his deposition, Sheriff Block
stated that he keeps no record of suits against his deputies because "lawsuits, in and of themselves, do not indicate misconduct. [A lawsuit] can be based on many things and include large
numbers of people who are totally uninvolved in an incident in reality." Id.
174. Telephone Interview with Lieutenant Douglas Seiberling, supra note 46; see also, eg.,
Taylor, supra note 136, at 26 (noting that in context of pattern and practice suits for failure to
discipline, disciplinary proceedings are often not reopened even after a civil judgment or settlement in favor of plaintiff); Taylor, supra note 97, at 43 (noting that Chicago Police Department
does not reopen or reconsider complaints even in light of a civil suit award or settlement).
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philosophy, police departments typically do not put information about
175
lawsuits in the officer's personnel file.
(3) No Correlation Between Civil Suits and Promotion

There is also no correlation between lawsuits and promotion of officers. 176 Most departments use a civil service system for promotion,
based on an examination and a discretionary selection of the top three or
five candidates. 177 Some departments, like the Oakland police, consider
178
personnel files at the final selection stage.
Civil suits are never considered in the promotion process since they
are not recorded in personnel files. 179 Officers' personnel files only have
records of discipline. 180 Thus, the only way an officer's violent tenden175. Telephone Interview with Lieutenant Doug Anderson, supra note 166; Telephone
Interview with Lieutenant Thomas P. Donohoe, supra note 94; Telephone Interview with
Lieutenant Douglas Seiberling, supra note 46.
176. Telephone Interview with Lieutenant Doug Anderson, supra note 166 ("Litigation
and civil suits play no role in promotion."); Telephone Interview with Jaye Erickson, Senior
Personnel Analyst, Consent Decree Division, San Francisco Police Department (Feb. 10,
1992) ("Suits play no formal role in promotion."); Telephone Interview with Lieutenant Douglas Seiberling, supra note 46; Telephone Interview with unnamed source in Oakland Police
Department (Feb. 6, 1992) ("The chief might be aware of a suit, but it is doubtful it plays any
role in promotion.").
177. For example, San Francisco Police Department promotes through an exam; the chief
or supervisor can then choose one of the top three candidates (unless otherwise affected by
court consent decree). Telephone Interview with Jaye Erickson, supra note 176. The Oakland
Police Department promotes through an exam and the chief selects among the top five candidates. Telephone Interview with Lieutenant Doug Anderson, supra note 166. See also Interview with John Crew, supra note 11 ("Promotion is generally a function of the civil service test
and internal politics.").
178. Telephone Interview with Lieutenant Douglas Anderson, supra note 166 (stating that
the chief of the Oakland Police Department, when making a final selection from the list of topscorers on the exam, may look over personnel files); see also CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at xviii (reporting that Los Angeles Police Department uses civil service
process for promotion and also looks at performance evaluations, educational and training
background, and all sustained complaints); Telephone Interview with Pam Lorton, Associate
Governmental Program Analyst of the California Highway Patrol (April 2, 1993) (describing
how the California Highway Patrol promotes up to the Lieutenant level using a written test, a
writing exam sample, an oral exam, and the candidate's statement of qualifications, annual
performance appraisals, disciplinary action data, and sustained citizen complaints).
179. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Lieutenant Doug Anderson, supra note 166 ("Information about a civil suit has no place in [an Oakland Police Department] personnel file
because it doesn't mean anything anyway."); Telephone Interview with Lieutenant Thomas P.
Donohoe, supra note 94 (distinguishing civil suits and personnel records as two separate record
systems-no lawsuits go in San Francisco Police Department personnel files); Telephone Interview with Lieutenant Douglas Seiberling, supra note 46 (noting that Richmond Police Department records of suits are only kept by the Risk Manager, who works in the city's finance
department and is responsible for evaluating any claims against the city); see also Wallace,
supra note 97, at Al ("Being sued repeatedly does not necessarily hinder promotion or assignment to train recruits in the field.").
180. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Lieutenant Doug Anderson, supra note 166 (pol-
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cies can be spotted is if discipline was imposed as a result of an internal
affairs investigation. As the next Section will discuss, the internal affairs
process is often flawed and does not always result in discipline. 18 1 Consequently, officers can be repeatedly sued and found liable, yet have clean
182
personnel records.
Furthermore, an officer's record of unsustained complaints (i.e.,
complaints filed but found by internal investigators to be unsubstantiated) is rarely in the personnel file. 183 The cumulative record of complaints, normally kept in the internal affairs department, is generally not
184
examined for promotional purposes.
Police departments and unions openly defend the promotions process, claiming that lawsuits are not indicative of an officer's conduct and
1 85
that they have no place in the promotion process.
The fact that an officer was sued doesn't mean anything. A settlement
doesn't mean an officer did anything wrong. Even if there was a judgment, we would already have investigated it internally. That is all that
is relevant. The court
judgment is not an appropriate way to evaluate
186
officers' behavior.
icy at Oakland Police Department); Telephone Interview with Lieutenant Thomas P. Donohoe, supra note 94 (policy at San Francisco Police Department); Telephone Interview with
Lieutenant Douglas Seiberling, supra note 46 (policy at Richmond Police Department).
181. See infra notes 191-224 and accompanying text for a general discussion of problems
underlying internal affairs investigations.
182. See, e.g., Wallace, supra note 97, at Al (reporting that city of San Francisco has paid
damages in 54% of all adjudicated suits filed for police misconduct during the last six years,
yet during that same period, less than one percent of complaints resulted in disciplinary
action).
183. See, ag, Telephone Interview with Irene Rapoza, supra note 99 (stating that at the
San Francisco Police Department, "[n]o matter how many complaints an officer receives, unless they are sustained complaints and discipline is meted out, they will not show up in his
personnel file.").
184. Id; see also CHRISTOPHER CoMMIssIoN REPORT, supra note 14, at xviii ("The
number and nature of any not sustained complaints, however, is not considered [in the promotion process]."); Telephone Interview with John Crew, supra note 11 ("Complaints don't generally hurt promotion chances.").
185. Wallace, supra note 97, at A6 C"'Just because a police officer is sued and the city pays
out a certain amount of money to settle it doesn't mean there should be disciplinary action.'"
(quoting Paul Chignell, Vice President of the San Francisco Police Officers Association)); Telephone Interview with Lieutenant Doug Anderson, supra note 166; Telephone Interview with
Lieutenant Richard Ehle, supra note 99; Telephone Interview with Lieutenant Douglas Seiberling, supra note 46; see also Declaration of Robert Mann, supra note 173, at 1-2 (discussing
deposition of Los Angeles Sheriff Sherman Block on December 4, 1990, in Espinoza v. County
of Los Angeles). In his deposition, Sheriff Block states: "We do not [keep records of lawsuits
against deputies]." Id. at 1. When the attorney asked why this is so, Block responded, "Because we are interested in factual allegations of misconduct. And lawsuits, in and of themselves, do not indicate misconduct.... [L]awsuits are not determinative of behavior." Idat I2. Block further stated that, "without question," he has more faith in the department's investigative procedures than he has in judicial determinations. Id at 2.
186. Telephone Interview with Lieutenant Doug Anderson, supra note 166; see also Decla-
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Civil rights attorneys challenge the effectiveness of the promotions
process, claiming that officers with histories of violence and long com1 87
plaint records continue to be promoted.
Complaints and suits do not often result in any significant changes out
on the street. I have personally seen officers with many complaints
made into FTOs-two I can name specifically. I have also witnessed
one officer promoted to Sergeant, and another to Captain. In the last
case, the promotion to Captain occurred right after the [Berkeley] People's Park demonstrations, in spite of the fact that the officer received
several complaints about his conduct during the demonstrations. 188
While at least one police department has begun taking citizen complaints more seriously,1 89 no attempt has been made by police departments to consider civil suits in the promotion process. Police
departments defend this practice on the grounds that "internal affairs
[investigations] go further than courts do in discovering if misconduct
ration of Robert Mann, supra note 173, at 2 (statement of Los Angeles Sheriff Block) ("[T]he
process of lawsuits in itself is not as significant as conduct and behavior which we investigate
internally.").
187. Telephone Interview with Jim Chanin, supra note 11 ("If promotions were based on
the brutality record, there would be more deterrence."); Interview with John Crew, supra note
I1 ("The ACLU has found that in many departments, there is no real culture created that says
that abuse on record hurts promotion."); Telephone Interview with Karol Heppe, supra note
26 ("Police Watch has observed the ten-year span of promotions [of certain Los Angeles Police
Department officers] even though the officers have five to ten complaints in their file. There is
no correlation between promotion and complaints filed."); Telephone Interview with Osha
Neumann, supra note 11 ("If police administration doesn't look at records of abuse when
making decisions about hiring, retention, and promotion, then suits really have little role in
deterring officers' conduct."); see, e.g., Taylor, supra note 136, at 43 (discussing promotions of
Chicago police officers who have histories of violence).
Attorneys also state that records of violence do not generally hurt an officer's chance of
laterally transferring to another department. Recently, NBC News Dateline aired a program
about police officers who have a history of violence, but who manage to hide their past by
moving from police department to police department. See NBC News Dateline: Gypsy Cops
(NBC television broadcast, Nov. 24, 1992). The program discussed the prevalence of these
"gypsy cops" who quit their jobs to avoid being disciplined for brutality, and then go to another city and get hired by a different police department. Id. The hiring police department
does not learn of the gypsy cops' history of violence because there is no state or federal system
to track personal histories of police officers, and because many police departments cover up
their officers' brutality when asked for a reference. Id.
188. Telephone Interview with Osha Neumann, supra note 11. Expert witness and former
police officer Frank Saunders, who has testified at trials throughout the United States for the
last twelve years, says he has seen defendant cops promoted in spite of their histories of violence. Telephone Interview with Frank Saunders, supra note 13.
189. Recognizing the problem, the San Francisco Office of Citizen Complaints (OCC) initiated a procedure in August 1986 under the "Personnel Improvement Program." Telephone
Interview with Irene Rapoza, supra note 99. Supervisors within the police department have
binders of citizen complaints, organized by officer name. Id. The OCC sends a weekly report
to supervisors, listing recently filed complaints. Id. The OCC hopes to call more attention to
complaints; previously, the OCC office (a separate office from the police department) had been
the only place where records of complaints were on file. Id.
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occurred."' 90 As discussed in the next Sectionj the internal affairs process is not always successful in properly investigating and stopping police

brutality.
(4) InternalAffairs Is a Flawed Way to Investigate Excessive Force Claims

In most police departments throughout the United States, citizen
complaints are investigated by the internal affairs division or by a body
composed of police and civilians, with ultimate control resting with the
police department.' 9 1 This is often the sole method of investigating excessive force complaints.192 The division is located within the police department-the investigators are police officers, and the entire process is
concealed from the public.1 93 The only information a complainant receives is the final outcome: whether the complaint was dismissed or
4
sustained.

19

Details such as the discipline imposed on the officer are completely
confidential.1 95 Departments claim to be bound by either California Penal Code section 832.7 or the "Peace Officers Bill of Rights"' 19 6 or both to
keep this information confidential. 197 According to John Crew, a police

practices specialist with the ACLU, no attorney or police officer has ever
been able to point out any language in the "Peace Officers Bill of Rights"
190. Telephone Interview with Lieutenant Doug Anderson, supra note 166; see also Telephone Interview with Lieutenant Richard Ehle, supra note 99 ("The Internal Affairs division
is more effective. A higher percentage of complaints is sustained by Internal Affairs than by
the citizen complaints board.").
191. Taylor, supra note 97, at 37.
192. HOFFMAN ET AL., supra note 79, at 9 ("The lack of independent civilian involvement
in the police complaint process also undercuts the credibility of many systems. Internal affairs
processes that involve the police policing themselves are viewed by the public with great skepticism."); Interview with John Crew, supra note 11.
193. Beth Barrett & David Parrish, DepartmentOfficials Say All Accusations Investigated,
L.A. DAILY NEWS, May 5, 1991, at 9; Telephone Interview with Tony Boskovich, Chair, Ad
Hoe Citizen Review Subcommittee, Bar Association of Santa Clara County, California (Feb.
13, 1992); Telephone Interview with Karol Heppe, supra note 26; see also Antonio H. Rodriguez, So, You Have a Complaint?, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1991, at B7.
194.

See HOFFMAN ET AL., supra note 79, at 8-9.

195. Id at 8 ("The blanket of secrecy that covers many complaint processes leaves even
the complainants in the dark about the results of their own cases."); Antonio H. Rodriguez,
supra note 193, at B7. ("You will not be informed of the outcome of the [internal affairs]
investigation. It is privileged and confidential information.").
196. See CAL. GOv'T CODE §§ 3300-3311 (West 1980 & Supp. 1993). These sections are
commonly referred to as the "Peace Officers Bill of Rights."
197. Telephone Interview with John Crew, supra note 11; see, e.g., Andrea Ford, Police
PrivacyLaw Comes UnderFire,L.A. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1991, at B3 (stating that various Southern
California Police departments claim they are prevented by the "Police Officers Bill of Rights"
from divulging citizen complaint information); Telephone Interview with Irene Rapoza, supra
note 99 ("We can't release any personnel information to the public because of Penal Code
§ 832.7."); see also CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 3300-3311 (West 1980 & Supp. 1993); CAL. PENAL

CODE § 832.7 (West Supp. 1993).
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that relates to confidentiality of citizen complaints and discipline; rather,
the confidentiality requirement is a complete myth that has traveled
throughout police departments.1 98 Furthermore, it is unclear whether
Penal Code section 832.7 requires this confidentiality either. Case law
interpreting section 832.7 is split on the issue. 199 The ACLU of Northern California has been working for many years to try to clarify the issue
and to open up the complaint process to the public. 2°° Some speculate
that politics, rather than state law, are the real reason for the secrecy;
police unions and chiefs are opposed to releasing disciplinary information
to the public. 20 Whatever the case, this lack of public information is
disturbing to complainants and the public, who want to know that their
complaints were taken seriously and that discipline was meted out where
2
deserved. 20
198. Telephone Interview with John Crew, supra note 11.
199. See Bradshaw v. City of Los Angeles, 270 Cal. Rptr. 711 (Ct. App. 1990). The Bradshaw court held that Penal Code § 832.7 "only precludes disclosure of peace officer records
.. in any criminalor civil proceedings.' "Id. at 718 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 832.7 (West
Supp. 1990). The court found no legislative intent to create a requirement of confidentiality
other than in civil and criminal judicial proceedings. Id. at 716. In other words, police departments have discretion to disseminate information about a particular officer to the public. Id. at
714. But see San Francisco Police Officers' Ass'n v. Superior Court, 248 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Ct.
App. 1988) (leaving an open question as to whether public participation in citizen complaint
investigative hearings would violate § 832.7); 73 OPS. CAL. ATr'Y. GEN. 90 (1990) (Attorney
General opinion stating that § 832.7 creates confidentiality requirements for "citizens' complaint records and information obtained therefrom."); 71 Ops. CAL. ATr'Y. GEN. 247, 250
(1988) (opinion interpreting Penal Code § 832.7 as creating general confidentiality privileges);
Memorandum from Mara Rosales, Deputy City Attorney, San Francisco, to San Francisco
Police Commissioners, Jan. 22, 1992 (stating San Francisco city attorney position that San
Francisco Police Officers Ass'n v. Superior Court leaves an open question about Penal Code
§ 832.7) (memorandum on file with author). See also Hallye Jordan, Assembly Public Safety
Committee Members Try to Balance Officer's Right to Privacy, Public Interest, SAN JOSE POST
REC., Oct. 15, 1990, at 1-2 (discussing conflict in interpretation of Penal Code § 832.7).
200. See Interview with John Crew, supra note 11; see also Jordan, supra note 199, at 1-2
(discussing ACLU efforts to clarify confidentiality issue and to make complaint information
available to the public); Susan Sward, S.F. Faces Tough Police Issues, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 15,
1992, at A13, A19 ("[T]he ACLU is pushing to increase the openness of the disciplinary procedures conducted by the independent civilian-run agency that investigates misconduct complaints against officers ....").
201. Telephone Interview with Tony Boskovich, supra note 193; Telephone Interview with
John Crew, supra note 11; see also Open Police Records, S.F. EXAMINER, Oct. 9, 1990, at A18
("Unfortunately police agencies have used a convenient (and mythical) interpretation of the
law to prevent release of all sorts of information adverse to the image of police .... ").
202. Telephone Interview with Tony Boskovich, supra note 193; Telephone Interview with
John Crew, supra note 11; Telephone Interview with Karol Heppe, supra note 26; see also
Keeping People in the Dark, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1990, at M6 (discussing the importance to the
public of open disciplinary hearings of police officers); Rodriguez, supra note 193, at B7; Secret
Records Harm the Public, SAN DIEGO TRIB., July 27, 1990, at B10 ("More disclosure [of
disciplinary action] ... would help restore police credibility.... The individual police officer's
desire for confidentiality must be balanced against the public's right to know."); Sward, supra
note 200, at A19 (describing a San Francisco task force pushing city to open up complaint
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Notwithstanding complainants' desire for access, police unions have
sought to introduce legislation making police records and discipline procedures even more secretive. 20 3 The efforts have been relatively ineffective. 20 4 Nevertheless, even after the Rodney King beating, legislation

was introduced in Sacramento to dramatically increase the privacy rights
of police officers and the secrecy of the investigative process. 20 5
This lack of public access has created a procedure prone to abuse.
In some cases the sole aim of the internal process is to establish the innocence of the officer. 20 6 In other cases, the matter is never fully investi-

process to complainants, claiming it is unfair for an accused officer to have more access to
information than the complainant).
203. Interview with John Crew, supra note 11; see also Taylor, supra note 136, at 30;
Taylor, supra note 97, at 41 (maintaining that police unions weaken the discipline apparatus
and try to close it to outside scrutiny); Paul Gullixson, Debate on Police Files Still Strong,
PALO ALTO PENINSULA TIMES TRIB., May 13, 1990, at B1, B3 (discussing California Senate
Bill 2764 and other California bills introduced in 1990 that sought to limit public access to
police files); Bert Robinson, 3 Bills ProposePenaltiesfor Leaks of PersonnelInformationAbout
Cops, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, April 26, 1990, at 1E, 3E (discussing the state bills introduced in 1990 that proposed to tighten the secrecy of police personnel information); Pamela
Wilson, Killea Seeks More Secrecyfor Police, SAN DIEGO DAILY TRANSCRIPT, June 25, 1990,
at 1 (discussing California Senate Bill 2764 (1990)).
204. Interview with John Crew, supra note 11.
205. Cal. A. 2067, 1991-92 Reg. Sess. (1991). Some of the proposed changes in the law
under A. 2067 are discussed below.
Under existing law, an officer who refuses to respond to questions or to submit to interrogations during the course of an investigation is subject to punitive action. The bill would
provide, instead, that an "officer under investigation shall have the right to refuse to make a
statement or to answer questions directly related to the investigation or interrogation" without
being subject to punitive action, except with regard to giving involuntary statements to an
outside agency investigating a citizen complaint. Cal. A.B. 2067, LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S

DIGEST, March 8, 1991 (on file with author).
The bill would provide that "investigative material... deemed confidential shall not be
used in any way against any public safety officer in any past, present, or future proceeding."
Id.
Under existing law, the head of an agency is not precluded by statute from ordering a
public safety officer to cooperate with other agencies involved in criminal investigations. "Existing law also provides that an officer who fails to comply with that order may be officially
charged with insubordination .... " The bill would remove an agency's right to charge an
officer with insubordination, prohibit the head of an agency from ordering an officer to give an
involuntary statement to any outside agency or department or entity and make the officer
immune from punitive action for refusing to give an involuntary statement to an outside
agency, department, or entity unless the outside agency is investigating a citizen's complaint.
Id.
Existing law permits the use of a public safety agency or officer to fulfill mutual aid agreements with other jurisdictions or to provide interagency cooperation. The bill would require
that any interrogation of an officer for the purpose of mutual aid must be conducted by the
officer's agency or department pursuant to all the statute's provisions. Id.
The bill did not pass. CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, ASSEMBLY WEEKLY HISTORY, No.
308, 1991-1992 Regular Session, at 550 (Oct. 9, 1992).
206. According to police officer and expert witness Frank Saunders,
internal affairs investigations can basically be a cover up. It becomes a process of
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gated. 20 7 As a result, in certain police departments throughout
California, the internal affairs process is under fire for its failure to discipline officers and to deter violence. 20 8 The media and city investigations
have revealed that certain officers have long histories of violence that
were not addressed by internal affairs or the officers' superiors. 20 9 Indiwhitewashing by internal affairs investigators. The investigators are given the job of
"tunnel investigating." That is, there's a predetermined conclusion and their job is to
find a way to get this conclusion. Certain departments I have seen or read about are
notorious for this.
Telephone Interview with Frank Saunders, supra note 13.
207. Attorney Oliver Jones claims that he has had first-hand witnesses testify at trial who
were never even contacted by internal affairs investigators. Telephone Interview with Oliver
Jones, supra note 13; see also AVERY & RUDOVSKY, supra note 2, at 4-1 to 4-2 (stating that
police may discourage witnesses from becoming involved in the investigations process); Taylor,
supra note 97, at 38, 41, 43 (citing examples of police department investigations of complaints
in which witnesses were disregarded or the investigations were "shoddy," "incomplete," "inefficient," and "biased").
208. For example, in her taxpayer's suit against the City and County of San Francisco,
Ruth Keady alleged that the city and the police chief
(a) Fail[ed] to institute disciplinary action in instances in which clear evidence of
substantial misconduct exists.
(b) Fail[ed] to act upon findings made by the Office of Citizen Complaints.
(c) Encourag[ed] police officers to disregard the constitutional rights of citizens.
(d) Condon[ed] acts of violence and other derelictions.
(e) Fail[ed] to properly train and instruct police officers regarding respect for the
rights of citizens.
Keady's First Amended Complaint, supra note 104; see also CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at xix, xx, 153-71 (conducting detailed study of the Los Angeles Police
Department that followed the Rodney King beating and finding the entire internal affairs process to be flawed and in need of "[a] major overhaul"); Bugliosi, supra note 119, at 160 (discussing an independent investigation of the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department, which
uncovered "deeply disturbing evidence of excessive force and lax discipline"). Outside of California, there also have been recent challenges to internal affairs divisions. See, e.g., Sean P.
Murphy & Toni Locy, Police Defense of Self-Probes Doesn't Tally, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 1,
1991, at I (reporting on Boston internal affairs division under fire); Janet Naylor, PG Council
OKs Panelto Review PoliceBrutality, WASHINGTON TIMES, July 4, 1990, at B6 (reporting that
Prince George County, Maryland approved a civilian board to review police brutality complaints in response to criticism of internal affairs process).
209. See, e.g., Sean P. Murphy, Researchers to Audit Internal Affairs; Team to Focus on
Police Unit's Procedures, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 8, 1991, at 23 ("Internal Affairs [of Boston
Police Department] has repeatedly failed to substantiate allegations of misconduct against officers who have long histories of citizen complaints."); Sean P. Murphy, Officer Remains Despite Charges,PriorRecord, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 2, 1991, at 1 (reporting that Boston internal
affairs division is under fire for hiring and retaining officers in spite of long record of complaints); Wallace, supra note 97, at Al (reporting that Office of Citizens Complaints, the San
Francisco Police Department's substitute for the internal affairs division, is under fire for its
failure to discipline officers who have a history of violence). According to the Christopher
Commission Report, "183 officers had four or more allegations [of excessive force or improper
tactics], 44 had six or more, 16 had eight or more, and one had 16 such allegations." CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14. Performance evaluations of officers failed to
record sustained complaints or to discuss their significance, and failed to assess the officers'
judgment and contacts with the public in light of disturbing patterns of complaints. Discipline
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vidual attorneys, as well, have learned through discovery that many officers have long records of public complaints filed at the police
2 10
department and that few officers are disciplined.
The failure of internal affairs to properly investigate and discipline
officers is attributed to many factors. The loyalty and camaraderie
among police officers makes it nearly impossible for internal affairs officers to be unbiased in their approach to complaints. 21 1 The process of
having one officer's misconduct judged by a fellow officer (the internal

affairs investigator) often results in a very different conclusion than the
public would reach. 2 12 Officers are generally more sympathetic to one
another because of an unavoidable, subconscious bias. 21 3 Lastly, some

of officers who were sued for serious brutality was "frequently light and often nonexistent."
Ia
210. See Telephone Interview with Karol Heppe, supra note 26 ("It is rare that discipline
was imposed. A cop has hardly ever been fired for his misconduct. In cases where discipline
resulted, it was normally a mere oral or written reprimand, or at worst, a one to two day
suspension with pay."); Interview with Susan Rubenstein, supranote 100 (stating that in one of
her recent cases, Wright v. City & County of San Francisco, No. C89-3390 & No. C89-3724
(N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 13, 1992) (consolidated cases), discovery revealed that one named defendant, Officer James Lassus, had a long history of complaints); Telephone Interview with Dan
Stormer, supra note I 1 ("In most cases where I learned that the officer had a record of complaints, no discipline had been imposed."); Telephone Interview with Carol Watson, supranote
13 ("Only the most minor discipline of the officer usually resulted."); see also Bugliosi, supra
note 119, at 160 (a former Los Angeles District Attorney discussing the failure of internal
affairs to discipline in the large majority of cases as a result of the code of silence).
211. See supra notes 143-146 and accompanying text.
212. Telephone Interview with Tony Boskovich, supra note 193.
213. See, e.g., Tobar & Berger, supra note 143, at A18 (reporting that a majority of Los
Angeles Police Department officers agreed with verdict in Rodney King trial, acquitting four
white officers). Police officers generally feel that an internal investigation by other officers is
best because "the investigating officers understand the situation better, having been there
themselves at one time." Interview with Christopher Lefferts, supra note 61; Interview with
Herbert L. Terreri, supra note 61. This very "understanding of the situation," however, unavoidably leads to a bias in the way officers approach complaints. Internal affairs officers approach complaints with a preconception that influences their investigation. For example,
when asked about patterns of complaints against particular officers, Lieutenant Douglas Seiberling of the Richmond Police Department Internal Affairs division responded:
Yes, a lot of the time we do see the same officer come up again and again. But you
must look at the type of work [the officer] does. For example, he may be on the street
narcotics unit. Also, some citizens complain a lot about a particular officer even if
he's doing his job. [The citizens] will pick on an officer to try to undermine his
position on the street. These complaints are taken with a grain of salt. They are still
investigated, but all circumstances are considered.
Telephone Interview with Lieutenant Richard Seiberling, supra note 46. Lieutenant Richard
Ehle of the Oakland Internal Affairs division answered similarly:
Yes, the most aggressive officers show up in complaints over and over. But it is the
nature of the beast. That is, the most aggressive officers who handle drug cases are
likely to be complained about the most. Often they are just malicious complaints
meant to hurt the officer. For example, drug dealers will typically complain to have
an impact on their criminal case. Often the public defender encourages criminal
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officers view low levels of excessive force, such as excessive shoving, grabbing, or restraining of a suspect, as just "bad style," not worthy of disci2 14
plinary attention.
The effectiveness of internal investigations is also greatly influenced
by the attitude of the upper ranks. The chief and the superior officers
establish the level of violence that a department will tolerate. 215 If there
is no pressure from the upper ranks to conform with the rules, then internal affairs investigations become a sham. 2 16 The very standards by which
an officer is evaluated become so lenient that internal affairs divisions
2 17
sustain very few civilian complaints.
The internal affairs process is further flawed because the imposition
of discipline is heavily influenced by the chief of police. 218 Even if the
internal affairs division properly investigates a complaint, the final decision regarding discipline rests, in most cases, with the chief.2 19 If a chief
refuses to impose discipline despite the investigative findings, he sends a
clear message to the ranks that brutality is acceptable. 220 In this sense,
the chief plays an enormous role in setting the tone for the department,
and greatly influences the standards the internal affairs department
adopts in its internal investigations.
An additional basic flaw of the internal affairs process is its location
within and connection to the police department.
Internal affairs departments are not open to receiving complaints. It is
common practice that when a person goes to the department to make a
defendants to make a complaint for this very reason. We must be careful not to
stigmatize an officer just because of complaints. By the nature of the job, they are
going to incur complaints.
Telephone Interview with Lieutenant Richard Ehle, supra note 99.
214. Interview with Herbert L. Terreri, supra note 61; see also CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 166 ("[V]iolent behavior, such as the use of batons, is viewed
by many members of the [Los Angeles Police Department] as not requiring discipline at all
because, as this officer said, 'some thumping' is permissible as a matter of course."); Ricker,
supra note 13, at 46 (stating that many police officers who witnessed the Rodney King beating
felt that the incident was handled properly by the police).
215. See supra notes 155-169 and accompanying text.
216. See HOFFMAN ET AL., supra note 79, at 6.
When incidents of brutality, misconduct or racism occur, the chief's immediate reaction to these incidents will have a great impact on whether the incident will be repeated in the future. A chief that seems more concerned with protecting the
department's image than with identifying and disciplining the wrongdoer can send
the message that getting caught is a worse sin than the underlying misconduct.
Id.; Barrett & Parrish, supra note 60, at A8 (reporting that investigation of Los Angeles Police
Department revealed marked leniency with regard to handling of police brutality cases).
217. Taylor, supra note 136, at 26; Taylor, supra note 97, at 46-47; see also Barrett &
Parrish, supra note 60, at Al (reporting that Los Angeles Police Department sustains very few
complaints).
218. See supra notes 155-156, 161-169 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 162-164 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 155-156, 161-169 and accompanying text.
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complaint, the first thing the investigating officer does is bring up the
person's name on the computer to see if there are any outstanding warrants. If there are, the officer will arrest the person on the spot. Another common story we hear over and over is that the investigative
officer will try to talk the person out of filing the complaint, or, once a
complaint is filed, the police will show up at the complainant's house
to try to talk him into withdrawing [the complaint]. The cops will2 say
21
things like, 'You don't want to ruin this officer's career, do you?'
As a result of this practice, citizens lose faith in the internal affairs process and stop filing complaints. 222 This progressive loss of confidence has
223
been evident over the last ten years in Los Angeles.
Cities throughout California have begun to address the problems of
internal affairs investigations by setting up independent citizen oversight
committees. 224 In Santa Clara County and the City of San Jose, the Bar
221. Telephone Interview with Karol Heppe, supra note 26; see also supra note 154. In his
article So, You Have a Complaint?, Antonio Rodriguez states:
[The knowledge that filing a complaint] is a waste of time [is] solid ghetto and barrio
wisdom. It is based on the knowledge that police officers, who are sometimes even
friends of the culprit, will investigate the complaint, and that the percentage of sustained complaints is woefully low .... [Officers will retaliate against those who dare
to report them for brutality or verbal abuse. These officers have been known to
threaten people, roust people, arrest them for nothing and sometimes even harm
them physicaly .... [When filing a complaint], the officer will interrogate you right
there or refer you to a sergeant, who will ask you, usually in an unfriendly manner,
why you want to file a complaint. He or she may try to discourage you by telling you
that the officer is married, has children, and that your filing will put the officer's job
in jeopardy. You may even be told that what the officer did was legal. Or maybe
they will tell you that they have no complaint forms .... The officer will grill you,
cross-examine you and try to tear apart your story, often in a hostile manner.
Rodriguez, supra note 193, at B7.
222. Telephone Interview with Karol Heppe, supra note 26; see also Rodriguez, supranote
193, at B7 (citing the intimidation and harassment Latinos and African-Americans face when
filing complaints against the Los Angeles Police Department as the reason the number of
citizen complaints are not representative of the actual number of incidents); Telephone Interview with Oliver Jones, supra note 13 ("Statistics about the number of complaints filed each
year are misleading because once people have lost faith in the internal affairs process, they just
stop filing complaints. I have had several clients express this to me.").
223. Telephone Interview with Karol Heppe, supra note 26 ("Many people who call Police
Watch say that they didn't file a complaint with the police department because 'nothing ever
happens' and 'it is a waste of time.' ").
224. Telephone Interview with Donald Casimere, supra note 61 ("Civilian oversight committees are fairly common in California. They are generally effective in providing a greater
sense of accountability."). In 1980, the city of Oakland established the Citizen Complaint
Board, which has the authority to investigate complaints of excessive force and to act as an
appellate review board for citizens who want to appeal the findings of an internal affairs complaint investigation. Telephone Interview with Larry Carroll, Senior Complaint Investigator,
Oakland Citizen Complaint Board (Feb. 10, 1992); Telephone Interview with Lieutenant Richard Ehle, supra note 99. In Richmond, the Police Commission was established to serve as an
appellate review board and to investigate complaints dealing with the issues of excessive force
and racism. Telephone Interview with Donald Casimere, supra note 61; Telephone Interview
with Lieutenant Douglas Seiberling, supra note 46. In 1983, the citizens of San Francisco went
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Association has formed an ad hoc citizen review subcommittee to study
and to formulate an ideal model for stopping police misconduct. 225 At
present, all police departments in the county are using internal affairs
systems to investigate complaints. 226 Committee chair Tony Boskovich
explains the reason for the Committee's formation:
Internal affairs systems do as thorough a job as they can in investigating. However, they become ineffective because they are hindered by
several things. First, a person who has been mistreated by the police is
afraid and doesn't want to deal with the police to file a complaint.
Second, there is subliminal pressure on internal affairs investigators because they are cops themselves. When someone is investigating his
own people, there is potential for subconscious bias and fear. Third,
there is a basic problem with the investigations [internal affairs] conduct[s] because [internal affairs officers] go into the community where
the event occurred and the residents don't trust cops and won't talk. If
a complaint ends up being one person's word versus the cop's word,
the complaint is never sustained. Fourth, the complainant often has
criminal charges pending against him and, under the advice of counsel,
won't talk because internal affairs could use the information against
him. Fifth, the complainant is only told the outcome
of the complaint
227
and he never learns if discipline was imposed.
Boskovich states that "even if the internal affairs is conscientious, civilian
review will only enhance the process.

' 228

Civilian oversight committees

are a step in the right direction. The committees must be given adequate
authority if they are to accomplish their goals. The next Section will
discuss common drawbacks that have prevented civilian oversight committees from being an active force in internal investigations and
discipline.
(5) Civilian Oversight Committees Lack Authority

Today, more than thirty of the fifty largest cities have Civilian Oversight Committees (COCs). 229 The structure and authority of these bodies
varies from city to city. 230 Many do not have binding authority over the
police chief or city manager. 231 Nevertheless, COCs without binding aua step further and established the OCC, which completely replaces the internal affairs division
and conducts all internal investigations of complaints. See SAN FRANCISCO CITY CHARTER
§ 3.530.2 (1992) (creating the Office of Citizen Complaints, placed under the direct supervision
of the Police Commission through a voter-initiated amendment).
225. Telephone Interview with Tony Boskovich, supra note 193.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Interview with John Crew, supra note 11.
230. Id.; see also HOFFMAN ET AL., supra note 79, at 9-10; supra note 224 and accompanying text.
231. For example, the Berkeley Police Review Commission has no direct disciplinary
power, nor can it recommend discipline. The Commission can merely send its findings to the
city manager and make policy recommendations to the city council. Telephone Interview with
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thority have still been very effective in cities where their recommendations are acted upon, 232 because COCs "generally make a more thorough
effort [than internal affairs divisions do] to collect evidence, weigh it, and
'233
look into all aspects of the complaint.
The COCs become ineffective, however, if the police chief, city man234
ager and city council ignore their findings and recommendations.
While some cities have attempted to give the COC findings more force,
such attempts are of limited utility if any discretion is left in the hands of
23 5
the police department itself.
While COCs are one step in the right direction, the inability of most
of them to prescribe discipline keeps them from more effectively solving
the problem of recurring police brutality. Furthermore, the failure of
COCs to take lawsuits into consideration when examining an officer's
Osha Neumann, supranote 11. The San Francisco OCC can only send its findings to the chief,
and has no power to impose discipline. Telephone Interview with Irene Rapoza, supra note 99.
The Richmond Police Commission does not have binding authority either. It serves as an
advisory board with power to pass along recommendations of policy and recommendations
based on complaint investigations. Telephone Interview with Lieutenant Douglas Seiberling,
supranote 46. The Oakland Citizen Complaint Board is also an advisory board without power
to impose discipline. Telephone Interview with Larry Carroll, supra note 224.
232. Telephone Interview with Donald Casimere, supra note 61 (noting that he has personally seen violent officers stop their misconduct after being disciplined, the discipline being a
direct result of the COC's findings and recommendation).
233. Interview with John Crew, supra note 11; see also Telephone Interview with Osha
Neumann, supra note 11 ("Civilian review can be an important part of the picture of what
leads to control of police abuse if they prove to be independent and effective.").
234. Telephone Interview with Osha Neumann, supra note 11 ("The Berkeley Police Review Commission has been ineffectual in some ways because the city council ignores it at
times."). The OCC in San Francisco is an example of this problem. In 1990, an OCC investigation found an officer guilty of using excessive force on a political figure, Dolores Huerta, yet
police Chief Frank Jordan refused to impose discipline. Harriet Chiang & Bill Wallace, A
FrontrunnerforS.F. Chief Under Probe, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 6, 1990, at A3. At the time, the
OCC did not have binding authority, so its findings and recommendations were useless in the
face of Jordan's refusal. Weiss, supra note 169, at Fl.
235. The San Francisco Police Commission recently passed Resolution 19-91. Letter from
Lieutenant Manuel Barretta, Secretary, San Francisco Police Commission, to Willis A. Casey,
Chief of Police, San Francisco Police Department (Jan. 28, 1991) (on file with Office of the
Police Commission, City and County of San Francisco, Hall of Justice, and with author).
Under the resolution, if the OCC sustains a complaint, forwards its finding to the police chief,
and the chief decides not to file a verified complaint against the officer, then the OCC director
can pass the finding along to the police commission. Id. The police commission can then
order the chief to file the complaint. Id. However, the OCC disciplinary process does not
allow for OCC appeal of officer discipline. If the chief files the complaint and holds a hearing
but does not impose adequate discipline on the officer, then neither the OCC nor the police
commission has the authority to force the chief to impose any additional discipline. See SAN
FRANcIsco CITY CHARTER §§ 8.343, 8.344 (1992) (explaining discipline procedure for police
officers). Thus, the police chief still retains full power over the extent of discipline meted out
to an officer found guilty of using excessive force.
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history of violence reinforces the lack of correlation between the civil
judicial process and police accountability.
E. Problem #4:

District Attorneys Rarely Criminally Prosecute Officers

The problem of police accountability is not confined to the internal
discipline mechanisms within a police department. The problem extends
to criminal liability. For various reasons, district attorneys throughout
236
the country rarely prosecute police officers for misconduct.
Criminal prosecution could be one of the most powerful deterrents
to police brutality; its remarkable absence in most cities greatly contributes to the pervasive cycle of abuse. 237 Part of the problem is that city
attorneys cannot reveal information about the suit to the district attor238
neys because of the attorney-client privilege.
The political components, however, are more commonly cited as
2 39
discouraging district attorneys from criminally prosecuting officers.
District attorneys and police departments work together closely as law
enforcement agencies, and have a close rapport, creating a built-in conflict of interest for the district attorneys. 24° Furthermore,
236. Bugliosi, supra note 119, at 158; Ricker, supra note 13, at 48; see also Police Watch,
Law Enforcement Data 3-4 (Nov. 8, 1991) (on file with author). The report states:
Since 1980 .. . the [Los Angeles] D.A.'s office declined to prosecute at least 278
police officers and sheriff's deputies accused of assaulting civilians with fists, clubs,
flashlights, leather-covered steel saps, pistol barrels, scalding water and electric stun
gun.... [On] September 5, 1991 the City Attorney's office.., filed criminal misdemeanor charges accusing an LAPD officer of assaulting a person during an arrest for
the first time.
Furthermore, deputies of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department were involved in 202
shootings, fifty-six of which "involved seriously questionable circumstances.... In none of the
202 shootings, including the questionable cases, has the D.A. 's office filed criminal charges
against the deputy." Id. (discussing statistics published in the Los ANGELES DAILY NEWS,
October 7, 1990) (emphasis added); see also Littlejohn, supra note 12, at 366 n.2 ("[C]riminal
verdicts against police officers for unlawful behavior are vastly more difficult to obtain than
civil judgments."); Watson, supra note 59, at M5 ("[T]he refusal of prosecutors to file charges
against [officers engaged in violence or who are dishonest about violence] allow[s] miscreants
to be secure in the knowledge that no penalty will [be] imposed on one who beats a person
....");Telephone Interview with Karol Heppe, supra note 26 ("A fundamental problem with
the system is that the D.A. never prosecutes cases, regardless if a civil suit is won. There can
be millions of dollars in civil awards, but no criminal prosecution results until a man videotapes the cops beating a guy up.").
237. Bugliosi, supra note 119, at 158.
238. Interview with Sarge Holtzman, supra note 12.
239. See, e.g., Bugliosi, supra note 119, at 160 (stating that political concerns of district
attorneys affect criminal prosecution of police officers).
240. Ricker, supra note 13, at 46, 48; Bugliosi, supra note 119, at 160 ("D.A.s and police
work together daily in their efforts against crime. Each is dependent on the other. A fraternity
develops between the two that weakens the resolve of the D.A. to go after members of that
team."); see also Telephone Interview with Alan Gordon, Staff Counsel, Office of Senator Art
Torres, State Capitol (Jan. 28, 1992) ("One of the premises of California Senate Bill 1335 is
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[p]olice are correctly viewed as the "thin blue line" that protects the
public from criminals and lawlessness. D.A.s-most of whom, after
all, are politicians, not statesmen-fear that the public might perceive
them as antipolice and anti-law enforcement, a significant negative at
election time. 24 1
Thus, civil suits may have criminal elements that warrant investigation by the district attorneys, 24 2 but criminal prosecution of police officers still rarely occurs. Currently, there is no state mechanism in place
243
to see that criminal charges are brought.
F. Problem #5: The Limits on Impact Litigation Aimed at Changing
Practices Within a Department

Civil litigation against a police department for a pattern and practice
of violence or neglect of discipline is another avenue attorneys pursue to
deter police brutality. A municipality can be held liable under section
1983 for failing to correct unconstitutional conditions and for
"tolerat[ing] a pattern and practice of misconduct so widespread that it
may be considered the unofficial custom or policy of the city." 244
that local prosecution of police officers doesn't work because of the close working relationship
between D.A.s and police officers."); Telephone Interview with Karol Heppe, supra note 26;
Telephone Interview with Frank Saunders, supra note 13. In January 1992, California State
Senator Torres (Chair of the now dissolved California Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on
Peace Officer Conduct) released a bill to address this exact issue. See Cal. S. 1335, 1991-92
Reg. Sess. (1992). Among the bill's provisions was a requirement that citizen complaints alleging felonious acts by officers be sent directly to the Attorney General's office. Id. The Attorney General, as a more impartial state arbiter than a district attorney, would have the first
opportunity to prosecute the officers, and if he should choose not to prosecute, would have to
file a written report explaining why. Id
The underlying premise of the bill was that the local prosecution of police officers does not
work because: (1) there is a close working relationship between the district attorney and the
city attorneys; (2) in big cities, the district attorneys are very popular figures, often elected,
vying for public support, and thus the process becomes political; and (3) in smaller cities, city
attorneys who would prosecute criminal cases against officers must defend them in a civil suit.
Telephone Interview with Alan Gordon, supra;see also Dresslar, supra note 122, at 7. The bill

died in the Senate Appropriations Committee on July 8, 1992.

CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE,

HISTORY, No. 305, 1991-1992 Regular Session, at 365 (Oct. 9, 1992).
241. Bugliosi, supra note 119, at 160.
242. For example, attorney Sarge Holtzman had one case in which the officer committed
three separate felonies: the officer kicked an unarmed person who was on the ground, filed a
false police report, and then perjured himself at his deposition. The district attorney never
investigated the matter. The civil suit against the officer was settled by the city. Interview
with Sarge Holtzman, supra note 12.
243. Telephone Interview with Alan Gordon, supra note 240.
244. Joyner, supra note 4, at 135-36; see, eg., Thomas v. City of New Orleans, 687 F.2d 80
(5th Cir. 1982) (affirming liability against the defendant municipality in a suit by a police
officer who was wrongfully fired for violating an unofficial but standard code of silence). For a
general discussion of pattern and practice suits based on failure to discipline, see Taylor, supra
note 136, at 25-26.
SENATE WEEKLY
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Pattern and practice suits against police departments, unfortunately,
are very difficult to win. To establish the city's liability, a plaintiff must
prove that a pattern and practice demonstrates "deliberate indifference."' 245 As discussed in Part III.C.3, this is a very difficult burden to
meet. 246 Overwhelming evidence is needed to show a pattern and practice. 247 Attorneys face the same problems of discovery as in lawsuits
against individual officers. 248 The impact of discovery battles is even
more severe in these cases since the information needed to establish pattern and practice is usually found only in internal police records and
9
files.

24

To win these suits, you need to show lots of occurrences, but this proof
is hard to get. The City stonewalls on discovery, far past the point of
fairness-to the point of borderline ethics. Cities would rather pay big
settlements than open up a can of worms by releasing this information.
This is not unique to San Francisco. It250is a fairly typical situation
around the country regarding discovery.
245. See supra notes 136-138 and accompanying text; see also Interview with Sarge Holtzman, supra note 12 (stating that in Keady v. City of San Francisco, the plaintiff was trying to
show that the failure to train and discipline amounts to deliberate indifference).
246. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989); see also supra notes 137-138
and accompanying text.
247. Taylor, supra note 136, at 26; Telephone Interview with Randy Baker, supra note 52;
Telephone Interview with Dennis Cunningham, supra note 16; Interview with Sarge Holtzman, supra note 12; Telephone Interview with Robin Toma, supra note 38 ("[T]o get enough
information to prove a pattern and practice, you must get volumes of material, and to get this
you have to fight tooth and nail."). In Silva v. Block, No. BC039633 (L.A. Super. Ct. filed
Oct. 9, 1991) and Lawson v. Gates, No. BC031232 (L.A. Super. Ct. filed June 24, 1991), the
ACLU is suing the Los Angeles Police Department and Los Angeles Sheriffs Department for
canine policies that result in hundreds of unnecessary dog bites each year. Examples of other
civil rights pattern and practice suits filed by the ACLU that required long and costly evidence-gathering include: Coalition Against Police Abuse v. Board of Police Comm'rs, Nos.
C243458, C375660, C399552, C327528, C381339, C413904 (L.A. Super. Ct. filed Sept. 1985)
(police spying), and Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 919 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1990) (Bivens suit
about the right of Salvadoreans to obtain counsel and to apply for political asylum).
248. See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
249. Telephone Interview with Randy Baker, supra note 52; Telephone Interview with
Dennis Cunningham, supra note 16; Interview with Sarge Holtzman, supra note 12; Telephone Interview with Robin Toma, supra note 38. For example, in the case of Keady v. City
and County of San Francisco, No. 907394 (S.F. Super. Ct. filed June 14, 1989), attorney Sarge
Holtzman served interrogatories asking for information from the police about what discipline
was imposed on an extensive list of officers who had been sued for misconduct. The city
refused to respond. See Notice of Motion and Motion for an Order To Answer Interrogatories
Pursuant to Evidence Code Sec. 1043 and 1045, No. 907394 (S.F. Super. Ct. filed July 25,
1991).
250. Telephone Interview with Dennis Cunningham, supra note 16.
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Furthermore, judges usually require a substantial evidentiary showing before allowing a plaintiff to proceed with a pattern and practice
claim. 251 One attorney characterizes this as an "institutional bias":
Courts have huge caseloads, and a pattern and practice suit is an enormous case for the court. A judge will want to scrutinize pattern and
practice evidence because [the court] is giving up a lot of time if it
allows this case to go forward ....
Judges adopt the 'smoking gun'
theory. In other words, they want hard evidence of the city's and the
police department's support [of the brutality or other misconduct].
There is rarely this kind of ['smoking gun'] evidence. So after months
and months of discovery battles, the judge will sometimes rule that
there's not enough evidence of pattern and practice. [The attorney]
can go on with the suit against the individual officer,
25 2 but the city and
the police department [defendants] are dropped.
These realities make pattern and practice suits very long, difficult and
costly.25 3 While the effect of a pattern and practice suit can be powerful,254 these problems of length, cost and difficulty limit the number of
suits filed and won by private attorneys.
Regrettably, private litigants are the only ones able to bring these
suits since the Justice Department lacks standing to bring a pattern and
practice suit against a police department, as determined in 1980 by the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. City of Philadelphia.255 Since 1980, the Justice Department has not6 been able to play an
25
active role in pursuing pattern and practice suits.
In sum, while successful pattern and practice suits are tremendously
effective in deterring repeated police abuse, the impediments to bringing
these suits limit their overall effectiveness as a solution.
251. Telephone Interview with Randy Baker, supra note 52; Telephone Interview with
Robin Toma, supra note 38.
252. Telephone Interview with Randy Baker, supra note 52. Note that once the city and
police department are dropped from the suit, it is no longer a pattern and practice suit, but
merely a suit against an individual officer; and any outcome affects only that single defendant.
253. Telephone Interview with Dennis Cunningham, supra note 16 ("[Pattern and Practice] suits can go on for years, what with discovery, appeals and retrials."); Telephone Interview with Robin Toma, supra note 38. In its suit against the Los Angeles Police Department
for illegal spying, the ACLU spent a large amount of money. Dozens of plaintiffs were involved, and deposing them alone took months and cost thousands of dollars. The city fought
the suit intensely but finally settled. Telephone Interview with Robin Toma, supra note 38.
254. For example, in one case against the City of Richmond plaintiffs won a three-milliondollar award, and the jury extended liability and responsibility for the wrongful deaths to the
individual officers, the police chief, deputy police chief, the city and its city council. See
Benfeil, supra note 41, at Al, A10.
255. 644 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1980); see also HOFFMAN ET AL., supra note 79, at 13. The
case involved the Justice Department's eight-month investigation of the Philadelphia Police
Department that discovered widespread abuses and violence among the officers. Id.
256.

HOFFMAN ET AL., supra note 79, at 12-13.
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The Limited Ways in Which Section 1983 Suits Are Effective

Up to this point, this Note has focused its discussion on the limitations of section 1983 suits, and why these suits do not have a deterrent
effect in most cases. However, it is vital that the many positive functions
of section 1983 suits not be overlooked. Section 1983 suits are important
tools and satisfy specific goals that are as important as the goal of
deterrence.
First and most obvious, section 1983 suits compensate the victims of
police misconduct. 2 57 Since many victims are poor, the financial compensation can have a tremendous impact on their lives. Thus, section
1983 suits serve a key function of bringing economic justice to those who
have suffered financial harm at the hands of police officers.
Second, the lawsuits bring political attention to the issue of police
brutality because of the high cost to taxpayers. 258 Conservatives and liberals are united by their outrage over the large monetary awards, and
they bring pressure on the city and the police to address the problem. 259
Third, the suits educate the public and keep the issue of police misconduct in the news. 260 "News coverage ...galvanizes public support.
So the goal of a suit may not be to win, but to get the word out there.
Suits turn public attention on the problem and can end up getting a com257. Telephone Interview with Jim Chanin, supra note 11; Telephone Interview with
Karol Heppe, supra note 26 ("Civil suits are the only kind of compensation a victim can receive since the D.A. rarely prosecutes."); Telephone Interview with Carol Strickman, supra
note 11 ("These suits channel plaintiffs' anger into a legitimate justice system and allow them
to get compensation."); Telephone Interview with Tito Torres, supra note 12; Telephone Interview with Carol Watson, supra note 13.
258. Telephone Interview with Robin Toma, supra note 38 ("Sometimes the only thing
that draws attention to police brutality suits is the cost. The high cost to taxpayers results
because local governments refuse to settle early in the cases and force these cases to trial. If
tile
city government intervened much earlier, costs would be minimal."); see also, McGreevy,
supra note 143, at 1 (city council members questioned Police Chief Gates about a pattern of
police misconduct before approving settlements of twelve suits); $7 Million to Settle Police
Misconduct Cases OK'd, L.A. DAILY J., Nov. 8, 1991 (payout in suits by L.A. City Council
brings issue to attention of city officials).
259. See, e.g., Victor Merina, Lawsuits Against Deputies Cost $32 Million Since '88, L.A.
TIMEs, Dec. 10, 1991, at Al (reporting that county board of supervisors considered hiring an
outside attorney to investigate the sheriff's department); Sean P. Murphy, Police Lawsuits Cost
City Millions, BOSTON GLOBE (city ed.), Nov. 28, 1991, at 58 (reporting that Boston city
council members consider establishing civilian review board, after more than three million
dollars paid in lawsuits); Louis Sahagun, $5.5 Million Settlement Offered to Man Paralyzed in
Police Shooting, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 2, 1991, at B8 (reporting that Los Angeles City Council
Budget and Finance Committee is examining rising cost of police-related litigation); Wallace,
supra note 92, at Al (discussing large damage awards in San Francisco for police misconduct,
and the lack of disciplinary action by the police department); Wallace, supra note 97, at A4
(reporting that Bar Association of San Francisco proposed eight-point plan for reforming the
San Francisco Police Department).
260. See, e.g., Ricker, supra note 13, at 48 (discussing the Rodney King case and four
other police brutality cases throughout the United States).
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munity coalition going. ' 261 The suits also educate citizens who sit on the
jury, which is an important part of the process since most middle-class
citizens are unaware of the prevalence of police brutality. 262 Civil fights
attorneys believe that this greater public awareness and scrutiny of police
brutality has brought change. 263 "Fifteen years ago, [police officers]
would beat people up all the time. Today, there are more limits on police. Police are aware of this and are much more careful not to beat
people up in public. People are also more sensitized to the issue and
'264
won't tolerate as much violence."

The fourth benefit of section 1983 suits is that they result in deterrence and change within the police department if the suits receive media
attention or severely affect the city financially. 26 5 The recent surge of
media attention to police misconduct suits may also be subtly encourag266
ing cities to settle more frequently.
261. Telephone Interview with Robin Toma, supra note 38. See, e.g., Los Angeles Ballot
Measure ProposesTighter Controlon Cops, OAKLAND TRIB., May 31, 1992, at A6 (stating that
community reform measures resulted from Rodney King case).
262. See Ricker, supra note 13, at 48 ("[The King case] puts a real doubt on the posture of
prosecutors that police are disinterested civil servants just 'telling it as it is.' ")(alterations in
original); Louis Sahagun, supra note 259, at Bl, B " 'The King incident and recent revelations about the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department have balanced the playing field in
courthouses where police are no longer cloaked in an aura of purity.'" (quoting Southern
California attorney R. Samuel Paz)); Telephone Interview with Jim Chanin, supra note 11;
Telephone Interview with Richard "Terry" Koch, supra note 11; Telephone Interview with
John Houston Scott, supra note 43; Telephone Interview with Robin Toma, supra note 38.
263. Telephone Interview with John Crew, supra note 11; Telephone Interview with Dan
Stormer, supra note 11.
264. Telephone Interview with Dan Stormer, supra note 11.
265. Telephone Interview with Jim Chanin, supra note 11 ("One or two suits have no
impact at all, but if it becomes a repeated problem and gets into big bucks, it gets noticed. I
know of one Oakland police officer who was sued over and over, and finally was pressured to
resign. The City gets upset when it gets too expensive."); Interview with John Crew, supra
note 11; Telephone Interview with Richard "Terry" Koch, supra note 11; Telephone Interview
with Osha Neumann, supranote 11 ("The Richmond suit resulted in some changes. A civilian
review board was set up and the chief of police resigned."); Telephone Interview with Frank
Saunders, supra note 13 ("If suits cost enough money, over a period of time, then the department will probably find a way to remove the officer from public contact or get him to resign.");
Telephone Interview with John Houston Scott, supra note 43 ("For example, the Richmond
suit in the early 80s resulted in big change because politically and economically the city could
not afford to let the brutality continue."); Telephone Interview with Robin Toma, supra note
38; Telephone Interview with Tito Torres, supra note 12; Telephone Interview with Carol
Watson, supra note 13 ("Palmer v. City of Los Angeles was one of those few cases where there
was enough publicity to have an effect. It cost the city about $3.5 million to compensate the
victims, and another million to pay back the property owners for the damage done to their
apartment houses. Some officers were disciplined and the department was shaken up."); see
also, e.g., Serrano, supra note 118, at Al, A16 (reporting that publicity of King beating
brought about an unprecedented move for reform in Los Angeles and resulted in federal review of police brutality complaints by the U.S. Attorney General).
266. Telephone Interview with Jim Chanin, supra note 11; Telephone Interview with
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Finally, the mere threat of a section 1983 lawsuit can have a deterrent effect, albeit minimal. 267 Thus, in spite of the failure of these suits to
deter abuse directly in most cases, civil rights lawyers continue to use
section 1983 as a legal tool to address police brutality. 2 68 Unquestionably, police misconduct would be worse without section 1983 litigation.
IV.

Proposed Solution

Sentiment surrounding the issue of police brutality varies: some
hope that the Rodney King incident will start a wave of reform, while
others feel that the problem is too widespread, that the courts are too
unreceptive to plaintiffs, and that the political arena is too compromising
to result in any serious changes.
These sentiments echo those from the days of segregation, when the
task of overcoming such institutionalized racism in America was daunting. Yet police brutality must be addressed with the same fervor and
political activism that integrated an entire country. When police officers
brutalize citizens under the color of law, this is a Constitutional violation
that should never be tolerated for any reason, regardless of the political
and legal difficulties hindering reform.
The public has a lot to lose if police brutality continues. From an
economic perspective, taxpayers bear the costs every time a police officer
is found liable. For example, in the City of Los Angeles alone, police
brutality has cost taxpayers more than $34.7 million from 1986 through
1991.269 Add to this the $717 million in property damages that resulted
from the riots following the verdict in the first trial of the four officers
who beat Rodney King, 270 and it becomes obvious that chronic police
Frank Saunders, supra note 13. For example, Los Angeles has recently settled twelve suits.
See McGreevy, supra note 143, at 1.
267. Telephone Interview with Richard "Terry" Koch, supra note 11; Telephone Interview with Carol Strickman, supra note 11. Attorney Terry Koch recounts a case in which the
threat of future litigation stopped police harassment:
Five or six years ago, a black man who was a transient was repeatedly arrested and
put in jail just for passing out red anti-apartheid ribbons in Berkeley. In all cases, he
was released from jail after a few hours and all charges were dropped-they [the
police] had nothing they could charge him with. I filed a § 1983 suit, even though
there were no damages. The suit was dismissed based on governmental immunity,
just as I had expected, but now the cops no longer harass this guy. Someone in the
upper ranks of the police department must have told the street officers to leave him
alone.
Telephone Interview with Richard "Terry" Koch, supra note 11.
268. See supra note 11.
269. Bugliosi, supra note 119, at 159. Note that this figure does not include settlements
and verdicts against the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department ($15.5 million between January
1989 and May 1992). Id.
270. Dean E. Murphy & Jim Newton, Bradley Lifts Curfew Tonight, L.A. TIMES, May 4,
1992, at Al, AS.
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brutality costs the entire society tremendous sums of money, not to speak
of the loss of human life.
Although it is not easy to place a numerical cost on the polarization
of whites and under-privileged minorities, this by-product of chronic,
unaddressed police abuse is equally damaging to our society. 271 Police
brutality alienates African-Americans and other minority groups, and it
makes them lose their belief in justice in this country. "This [loss of
belief in justice] is usually the greatest harm inflicted from police brutality. The bruises and cuts heal, but the disillusionment with society does
not go away. The result is generations of very angry and embittered
youths. ' 272 Not surprisingly, this anger manifests itself in the form of
273
riots and crime.
Furthermore, chronic police abuse undermines the effectiveness and
safety of all police officers.
For instance, there is no question that the Los Angeles Police Department-along with the L.A. County Sheriff's Department. . .- has suffered immeasurably from the conduct of the officers in the Rodney
King case. Following the King beating and verdict, anti-LAPD
venom is at an all time high: KILL THE LAPD... [is] scrawled on
the walls in South Central Los Angeles. So a small percentage of police stain the blue uniform and, by the hostility
they create, endanger
274
the lives of thousands of innocent officers.
Clearly, the public and all police officers have a vested interest in stopping the recurring cycle of police brutality.
A long-term, comprehensive approach to the problem of police brutality is necessary.
Police abuse has neither a single cause nor a single cure. It's not 'just'
an issue of racism or a lack of training or poor leadership, although all
of these can be extremely important factors. If the focus is on one of
these issues to the exclusion of the rest, the impact on the overall problem will be minimal.
Only a comprehensive approach ...can bring
2 75
lasting results.
271. Bugliosi, supra note 119, at 68, 161.
272. Telephone Interview with Gordon Greenwood, Deputy Public Defender at the San
Francisco Office of the Public Defender (Mar. 8, 1993).
273. Bugliosi, supra note 119, at 68 (discussing five massive race riots, from 1965 to 1992,
started by African-Americans in response to police brutality).
274. Bugliosi, supra note 119, at 68.
275. HOFFMAN ET AL., supra note 79, at 5. For example, the ACLU Police Practices
Project has devoted its resources to formulating a comprehensive policy approach to the problem of police misconduct. See id. at 6-15. The ACLU targets several political and legal areas
where it is necessary to address police misconduct. Id. The policy proposal calls for:
(1) Cessation of public and politicians turning over severe societal problems, such as
homelessness and widespread criminal activity, to law enforcement, and thus encouraging
"'anything goes' tactics." Id at 5-6.
(2) Improvement at a local level of systems within the police department: leadership,
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One obvious solution would be to change state law so that police
officers pay for their own defense and damages in a section 1983 suit.
This is not an effective solution, however, because it would deprive plaintiffs of a deep pocket. Attorneys and plaintiffs would have a disincentive
to pursue section 1983 litigation since a victory would not necessarily
result in the payment of attorneys' fees and damage awards.
For example, under a similar cause of action against a government
employee for a violation of civil rights, a Bivens suit, 276 the individual

employee must pay his own defense and damages.27 7 According to attorney A.J. Kutchins, one of the attorneys who litigated the well-known
Brian Wilson suit,27 8 the lack of a deep pocket proved to be financially
problematic in Wilson's suit. 279 "There is an assumption that there is a

remedy for these government violations because Bivens is on the books,
'280
but for all practical purposes the defendant is judgment-proof.
Furthermore, the government must be made accountable to give it
the incentive to develop policies and procedures to control police officers.
Large monetary awards and media attention in section 1983 suits provide
incentive for police and city officials to examine police department practices. 28 1 Large payouts to plaintiffs by cities also help galvanize public
and political support for police reform. 2 82 Therefore, switching economic accountability to the individual officer is not an effective solution.
Similarly, tying the outcome of civil suits to internal discipline of
police officers is so politically controversial and foreign to current systems that it is not feasible. Police departments challenge the validity of
civil suit outcomes and argue that only police officers can fairly review
policies, training, tracking the use of force, breaking the code of silence, and community sensitivity training. Id. at 6-8.
(3) Establishment of civilian oversight committees that have independence from the police department, investigatory power, mandatory police cooperation, adequate funding, formal
hearings, disciplinary impact, public statistical analysis, power to make policy recommendations, diversity of staff, and separate offices from the police department. Id. at 8-10.
(4) Increased federal criminal prosecution of police officers by the Justice Department.
Congressional legislation to give back to the Justice Department the power to file "pattern and
practice" civil lawsuits to enjoin police abuse where it is systematic. Id. at 11-15.
(5) Creation and funding of social, economic and education programs that address the
root causes of problems that afflict cities and lead to crime. Id. at 15.
276. A Bivens suit is a judicial cause of action against a government official for violating an
individual's constitutional rights under color of law. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
277. Telephone Interview with A.J. Kutchins, supra note 58.
278. Brian Wilson lost both his legs at a naval base demonstration in Concord, California,
when a government train loaded with weapons ran over him. See Paul Galloway, Peace Train:
A Shocking Injury Adds Steam to Vet's Crusade, CHI. TRIB., May 6, 1988, at 1.
279. Telephone Interview with A.J. Kutchins, supra note 58.
280. Id.
281. See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 258-259 and accompanying text.
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the actions of other officers. 28 3 Furthermore, neither police departments
nor civilian oversight committees look at civil suits as part of their inves2 84
tigative process.
Therefore, the focus of any reforms should be on the systems that
are already established and accepted. If operated properly, these existing
systems can succeed in controlling police officers.
A. Reinforcement of Internal Mechanisms That Control Police Misconduct
The first internal mechanism to address is leadership within police
departments.
Police chiefs and administrators set the tone for their departments in
their statements, deeds and attitudes toward the communities they
serve.
If a chief of police shows contempt for the legitimate concerns of

certain communities, the actions of his or her officers will most likely
mirror that contempt.... When incidents of brutality, misconduct or
racism occur, the chief's immediate reaction to these incidents will
have a285
great impact on whether the incident will be repeated in the
future.

As the Rodney King episode in Los Angeles demonstrates, a police chief
can silently condone violence for a long time before he is made accountable.2 86 Even then, it can be difficult to force a chief to resign. The first
proposal is to create a state-level citizen oversight committee that would
conduct investigations of police chiefs upon request of attorneys, city officials, or a citizen body. The findings would be a matter of public record
and would go back to the mayor and city council of the city in which the
chief works.
A second measure that would create internal police accountability is
legislation addressing the promotional process within police departments. The legislation would require that police chiefs and supervisors,
prior to promoting an officer, review her internal affairs file, personnel
fie, complaint file, and record of lawsuits. The chief and supervisors
would still have discretion in promotion, but would at least be making
informed decisions.
The legislation should also directly address the promotion of field
training officers (FTOs). As discussed in Section III of this Note, FTOs
283. HOFFMAN ET AL., supra note 79, at 9.
284. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. Even the Santa Clara County Bar Association subcommittee that is formulating an ideal model for police review, see supra text accompanying note 225, is not considering civil suits as an integrative element. Telephone Interview
with Tony Boskovich, supra note 193.
285. HoFFMAN ET AL., supra note 79, at 6.
286. See Andrea Ford, Anniversary Noted by Vigils, Rallies, Forums, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 4,
1992, at B1 (detailing police reform resulting from King beating); LA. Chief to Retire in June
After All, supra note 126, at Al (noting that fourteen-year Police Chief Daryl Gates was pressured to step down since the videotaped police beating of Rodney King).
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have a tremendous influence on new officers, since FTOs teach rookies
the acceptable street policies and ethics. Thus, the legislation would bar
officers with two or more sustained excessive force complaints from promotion to FTO. It is not unusual for a police officer to complete his
career as an officer without a single sustained complaint of excessive
force; 287 thus, two sustained complaints is not an unreasonable limit. By
limiting FTO positions to officers with clean records, rookie officers coming out of the police academy will retain the rules they have just learned;
this will foster a departmental culture of restraint and professionalism.
A third proposal is to establish mandatory racial and cultural
awareness training for officers who have a sustained a complaint or have
been found liable in a civil suit for brutality or race-related misconduct.
California State Senator David Roberti's bills, which were both vetoed by
Governor Wilson, would have instituted mandatory training for all of8
ficers and are good models. 28
A fourth proposal addresses the psychological factors underlying
police brutality. Counseling should be required for police officers with
more than one sustained complaint for excessive force or race-related
misconduct, or who have been found liable in civil court for any of these
actions. Mandatory counseling would ensure that officers with violent
tendencies are treated before the violence begins to escalate.
B.

Reinforcement of External Accountability Systems

To complete a comprehensive approach to the problem of police
misconduct, two additional proposals are necessary to reinforce the external accountability systems. External accountability is essential:
"[P]olice have developed an amazing resiliency against pressures to control their own abusive behavior. It seems that police will not alter conduct without outside compulsion; nor is altered conduct guaranteed even
'289
when outside compulsion is present.
The first proposal is the mandatory creation of citizen oversight
committees in every city in California, adopting the standards set out by
the ACLU. 290 The ACLU Police Practices Project states, in its policy
report:
The lack of independent civilian involvement in the police complaint
process ...undercuts the credibility of many systems. Internal affairs
processes that involve the police policing themselves are viewed by the
public with great skepticism. . . . Just as systems of independent
287. Interview with Christopher Lefferts, supra note 61; Telephone Interview with Frank
Saunders, supra note 13; Interview with Herbert L. Terreri, supra note 61.
288. See supra note 128.
289. Littlejohn, supra note 12, at 366 (footnote omitted).
290. See HOFFMAN, ET AL., supra note 79, at 10 (listing ten standards for citizen oversight
committees, which will assure the committees' effectiveness as a check on police department
actions).
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checks and balances serve to curb abuses of power in other government
institutions, civilian
review serves this same function with local police
29 1
departments.

If given adequate authority, staff and independence, oversight committees can effectively "check" police power 292 and address the fundamental
flaws of the internal affairs process.
The second proposal is to amend either California Penal Code section 832.7293 or California Evidence Code section 1043294 or both to ease
discovery, in state lawsuits, of officers' personnel records and histories of
violence. As discussed in Sections II and III of this Note, suits against
individual officers, and pattern and practice suits against police departments, are severely hampered by state judges' reluctance to grant discovery motions. 295 Since federal courts do not provide the same barriers to
discovery, 296 requiring the release of this information in state court cannot be characterized as an unwarranted intrusion of officers' privacy.
These proposals would enhance the external systems of police accountability. The ability to hold officers to policy standards is largely
dependent on victims being able to file complaints and lawsuits. The
current weaknesses in the litigation process and the internal affairs system often prevent the truth from coming out, thereby limiting the
effectiveness of each process. Easing discovery standards and creating
citizen oversight committees would be a first step in addressing these
shortcomings.
V.

Conclusion

Years after Congress enacted section 1983, attorneys, legislators and
citizens are questioning the effectiveness of this statute as a legal tool for
addressing police misconduct. The weaknesses of section 1983 suits are
numerous. At the outset, it is difficult to find an attorney to bring the
suit. Once an attorney is finally obtained, both plaintiff and attorney are
faced with a long, expensive and harsh battle with the city attorney's
office. The suits are complicated by unusual obstacles, ranging from jury
bias, to the code of silence, to discovery limitations. Moreover, the ability to obtain an injunction against unacceptable conduct is greatly limited by case law. Most disturbing of all is that even successful section
1983 suits do not seem to deter misconduct. The incidence of repeat
offenders is frequent and well-documented, leaving civil rights attorneys
frustrated as they must repeatedly sue the same officers.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

Id. at 9.
Id at 10.
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44

The lack of deterrent effect is due largely to the fact that both internal and external accountability systems have failed. In many cities and
police departments throughout the country, neither preventative measures nor corrective disciplinary actions are being taken. Thus, it is no
surprise that civil litigation, as a single accountability system, is ineffective in bringing about any broad change.
If we, as citizens and taxpayers, continue to turn our heads to pervasive police brutality, the brutality will continue along with the millions of
dollars in damage awards and settlements paid to brutalized plaintiffs.
The more humane option is to set up effective accountability systems to
stop this cycle of abuse. There is no shortage of proposed solutions. The
ACLU Police Practices Project, California legislators, and other local
bodies have a multitude of policy recommendations and bills already formulated. This Note, as well, has suggested solutions that address training, promotion, supervisor accountability, discipline, and citizen
oversight. The only component lacking is the political will to effect
change. The cost to society and to individuals' civil rights has already
been great. Hopefully, the Rodney King beating has sufficiently raised
the issue to the public's consciousness and will lead to the public and
political attention so badly needed.

